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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines resource-based, strategic group, and industry 
influences on firm performance. The resource-based view of the firm and strategic 
groups research are two areas of organizational inquiry that have lacked both theoretical 
as well as empirical integration. This dissertation provides a critical first step towards 
that end. Three papers are presented that first develop -  and then test -  resource-based 
and strategic group influences on organizational performance. The primary findings of 
this dissertation are threefold. First, variance in organizational performance exists both 
within and between strategic groups. Second, the degree to which firm, group, and 
industry explained variance in organizational performance varied based upon 
performance measure. Third, in all cases, firms accounted for the lion’s share o f the 
variation in organizational performance. In conclusion, the key determinant of 
organizational performance is manager’s capabilities to position their firm within their 
group as well as industry.
iii
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f this dissertation is to enhance strategic management research by 
improving our understanding o f how various decisions, processes, and environmental 
forces influence firm performance. Developing an understanding o f how to achieve 
superior firm performance continues to be one of the primary goals o f strategic 
management researchers (March and Sutton, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). 
Specific factors affecting firm performance stem from a bewildering array of influences 
including differences in firm resources (Barney, 1991; Wemerfelt, 1984), the industry 
environments where firms operate (Dess & Beard, 1984; Porter, 1980), and influences 
emanating from within industry subsets o f firms — referred to as strategic groups (Hunt, 
1972; Porter, 1979). These multiple factors influence how firms differ, and how those 
differences effect firm performance (Carroll, 1993; Nelson, 1991).
In this dissertation I take the position that understanding firm performance can 
best be accomplished by examining firm characteristics in the context o f the 
environments where they operate (Meyer, 1991; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994; 
Summer et al., 1990). Thus, the goal o f this dissertation is to build and test theory 
concerning multiple, multilevel influences on firm performance. I accomplish this goal 
by conceptually developing and empirically testing influences on firm performance 
derived from the firm, strategic group, and industry levels o f analysis. To rigorously 
accomplish this broad goal, the organization of this dissertation is as follows. I will 
present three papers that first develop and then test firm, strategic group, and industry 
influences on firm performance. I will now briefly describe each paper’s content and 
research goals.
l
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The first paper in this dissertation is a conceptual treatise that meets at the 
crossroads between two o f strategic management’s most investigated frameworks: the 
resource-based view of the firm and strategic groups research. Historically, assumptions 
behind these two views have put them somewhat at odds conceptually. Because the 
resource-based view o f the firm argues that sustained competitive advantage is best 
attained when firms have unique resources (Barney, 1991; Wemerfelt, 1984), this view 
argues that analyzing differences in individual firm resources is the best strategy for 
understanding performance differences. In contrast, strategic groups research argues that 
a number o f firms within the same industry can achieve sustained profitability if their 
strategies are similar to each other, but distinct from other industry members (Porter, 
1979). Thus, this view argues that understanding differences in firm performance is best 
accomplished by conducting analyses at the within-industry group level o f analysis. 
Recent work in strategic groups research has begun to bridge the gap between these two 
theories by suggesting that firm differences exist both within and between strategic 
groups (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1988). That is, any given firm can closely follow the 
basic recipe that defines a strategic group and be a “core” member of that group, or 
loosely follow the group recipe and be a “secondary” group member (Reger & Huff,
1993). The goal o f this conceptual paper is to develop propositions concerning 
contingencies when firm differences, group processes or both may lead to sustained 
competitive advantage. As well, I will provide implications for practitioners, as well as 
suggestions for future theory building and empirical tests combining the resource-based 
view and strategic groups research.
2
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The second paper in this dissertation builds on the conceptual work above by 
testing organizational resource and strategic group influences on performance on a 
sample of hospitals during a time o f considerable environmental change. I draw data 
from a single industry to provide a rich description of phenomena in an environment that 
has previously confirmed the existence of strategic groups. This empirical paper 
advances the field by simultaneously testing performance influences stemming from both 
the resource-based view o f the firm and strategic groups research. I first hypothesize that 
both organizational and strategic group levels o f analysis explain meaningful variance in 
hospital performance. Next, I hypothesize that strategic group characteristics will effect 
performance above and beyond organizational resources. Finally, I hypothesize that the 
effects of organizational resources will be more moderated by group characteristics.
To test strategic group performance influences I will derive strategic groups by 
clustering hospitals based on two variables indicating strategy type: source of competitive 
advantage and breadth of operations. By clustering, I am able to estimate group level 
variables that may explain organizational performance (e.g., average group operations 
breadth). I will test performance influences from multiple levels of analysis by using a 
hierarchical linear modeling technique (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). 
Specifically, this paper will use the HLM/2L statistical package (HLM: Bryk, 
Raudenbush, & Congdon, 1996) to partition the amount of variance in hospital 
performance that is explained by organizational and group levels o f analysis. HLM also 
directly tests the main effects strategic group characteristics (i.e., source o f competitive 
advantage) have on performance, and the moderating effects strategic group 
characteristics play in hospital resource — performance relationships.
3
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The third and final paper seeks to investigate a more generalizable model by 
examining firms in multiple industries with data drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. 
While the hospitals sample data allows for a rich investigation with high internal validity, 
provides well-formulated strategic groups, and controls for industry differences, drawing 
from a single context compromises the generalizability o f study findings. By examining 
multiple industries, the third paper builds on the second paper (i.e., hospital sample) by 
rigorously examining other contextual factors that may influence a firm’s ability to 
achieve superior performance. Notable environmental influences stem from industry 
differences (Porter, 1980). I hypothesize three specific industry influences affecting 
strategic group influences on firm performance: Resource abundance (i.e., munificence), 
volatility (i.e., dynamism), and complexity (cf. Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; 
Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). To analyze the effects o f multiple level influences on firm 
performance simultaneously, I will use the HLM/3L statistical package to assess the 
amount of variance in firm performance that is explained by the firm, strategic group, and 
industry levels of analysis. As well, multiple independent predictor variables will be 
included at each level of analysis to shed light on why one level may be more influential 
than others. While it is widely accepted that both firm resources and environmental traits 
play a role in determining firm performance (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997; Mauri and 
Michaels, 1998; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Rumelt, 1991), this study is 
the first to test firm, strategic group, and industry influences in a single model. In sum, 
this study is undertaken to enhance the generalizability of the findings in my dissertation 
while simultaneously providing insights about how industry characteristics as well as 
strategic group membership influence firm performance.
4
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This dissertation contributes to the field o f strategic management both 
theoretically and empirically by explicitly examining the determinants of firm 
performance from a multilevel perspective. It contributes theoretically by juxtaposing 
resource-based and strategic group influences on firm performance. This research 
contributes methodologically by testing multilevel influences on firm performance in an 
explicitly multilevel model using a methodology that has yet to be applied to the strategic 
management literature. Finally, the dissertation answers the call from researchers who 
have advocated integrating the resource-based view of the firm with strategic groups 
research (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992), and testing influences of firm and contextual 
factors in a single model (Dranove, Peteraf, & Shanley, 1998; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Rouse 
& Daellenbach, 1999; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a).
5
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THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE: COUPLING 
STRATEGIC GROUP AND RESOURCE-BASED VIEWS
A top priority for strategic management researchers is to develop a better 
understanding of the decisions, actions, and processes that lead to superior firm 
performance (March & Sutton, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). The strategic 
management field is set apart from related disciplines by the incorporation of multiple 
theoretical perspectives to aid in answering interesting and practical research questions 
such as the determinants o f firm performance (Jemison, 1981a; Meyer, 1991). The 
application of multiple theoretical approaches can provide the basis for rich descriptions 
o f organizational antecedents, actions, and outcomes (Combs & Ketchen, 1999).
The resource-based view o f  the firm  (RBV) and strategic groups research (SGR) 
are two perspectives on organizations that have received considerable attention within the 
last decade (e.g., Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Reger & Huff, 1993; Rouse 
& Daellenbach, 1999). The RBV argues that differences in firm resources and 
capabilities provide the basis for superior firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; 
Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984). In 
the long run, the most profitable firms are able to attract resources that are valuable, rare, 
difficult to imitate and without substitutes (Barney, 1991). From this perspective, firms 
differ in their abilities to acquire and deploy resources needed for sustained competitive 
advantage.
SGR focuses on sets o f firms within the same industry that follow similar 
strategies (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979, 1980; Reger & Huff, 
1993; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). Membership in a strategic group can be an 
important contextual influence, altering interpretations, actions, and ultimately
6
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performance (Dranove et al., 1998; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993). 
Under this view, firms need not be uniquely different in their resources and actions to 
attain above average performance within an industry.
There is considerable appeal in pairing SGR with the conceptual framework of 
the RBV. While the goal of both views is to explain firm performance, they have 
traditionally offered different prescriptions for achieving superior profitability. The RBV 
seeks to understand how the accumulation of unique resources is responsible for creating 
superior firm performance. In contrast, the theoretical models that underlie SGR have 
traditionally assumed that groups of firms can achieve above-average industry 
performance despite similarities in terms of strategies and strategically relevant resources 
(Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Porter, 1980, 1981; Rumelt, 1984; Scherer, 1980). While 
both views share the perspective that firms position themselves so that their strategies are 
difficult to imitate, they differ in their basic recipes for deterring imitation. The RBV 
argues that individual firms use “isolating mechanisms” to frustrate imitation of their 
unique strategy (Rumelt, 1984). In contrast, advocates of SGR believe that subsets of 
firms within an industry may generate superior performance when mobility barriers 
hinder strategy imitation by industry competitors (Hunt, 1972; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 
1989; Porter, 1979). Despite the aforementioned differences, the belief that firm 
performance is dependent upon manager’s decisions is germane to both views. For 
example, supporters of the RBV acknowledge firm performance is influenced by 
managerial choices, social competencies, and aspirations (Ginsberg, 1994). Likewise, 
strategic group theorists contend that firm superiority is partly a function of manager’s 
efforts to place their firm within a strategic group and to look towards group performance
7
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levels when setting aspiration levels (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Peteraf & Shanley, 
1997). Thus, while significant rationales separate these views, they are not altogether 
incompatible.
Neither perspective, used in isolation, has provided the “answer” for why some 
firms outperform others. Hence, simultaneous consideration of the RBV and SGR has 
the potential to yield considerable insights about how firms can achieve superior 
performance within their competitive environments (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rouse 
& Daellenbach, 1999). To progress towards that end, the goal o f this paper is to work 
toward integration of these two perspectives’ disparate insights on the determinants of 
firm performance. To further this goal I briefly review the RBV and SGR. I then offer 
propositions about how both firm resources, strategic group characteristics, or both 
influence strategic actions and outcomes. I conclude with implications for organizational 
decision-makers and guidance for future research.
Literature Review 
Review of the Resource Based Perspective
The central tenet of the RBV is that superior firm performance is a function of the 
firm’s ability to both accumulate and deploy scarce resources (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 
1984). Resources can refer to specific assets as well as human competencies and 
intangible abilities (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Under this view, resource 
accumulation is based on managers’ rationally guided motives for efficiency, 
effectiveness and profitability (Conner, 1991; Oliver, 1997). Acquisition barriers 
associated with resource accumulation may yield long-term advantages for firms (Amit &
8
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Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986b; Penrose, 1959). Ideally, firm resources will lead to 
sustained competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, without substitutes, and 
bundled in a manner so that the firm’s resources, and thus strategies, are inimitable by 
current and future competitors (Barney, 1991).
In a field that has historically lacked a distinct paradigm, the RBV has emerged as 
a central perspective in strategic management (Conner, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; 
Peteraf, 1993; Wemerfelt, 1995). The RBV has improved our understanding o f 
diversification (Markides & Williamson, 1996), human resource systems (Lado &
Wilson, 1994), organizational culture (Barney, 1986a; Fiol, 1991), strategic networks 
(Gulati, 1999), strategic regulation (Maijoor & Van Witteloostuijn, 1996) in addition to 
firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Although the RBV has become the cornerstone for building understanding about 
competitive advantage in the field of strategic management (Peteraf, 1993), the basis for 
this perspective is by no means novel. Economists have long relied on a similar concept 
o f Ricardian rents that can be generated from ownership o f valuable land, labor, capital, 
and entrepreneurial abilities (Ricardo, 1817). The RBV is also similar to SWOT analysis 
in which strategy formulation progresses by analyzing the “fit” between a firm’s 
positioning o f its internal strengths and weaknesses with the environment’s external 
opportunities and threats (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980). Originating at the 
Harvard Business School, this ‘design’ school o f thought is based on the premise that 
firms are idiosyncratic. Hence, performance can best be studied by analyzing a firm’s 
unique characteristics and traits (Mintzberg, 1990).
9
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In sum, the RBV assumes firm performance is a function o f holding and 
deploying unique resources. Desiring to equip their firms with scarce resources that will 
lead to superior performance, managerial choices drive the resource accumulation 
process. This view is well documented in the strategic management literature, and draws 
from classic economic thought as well. Although the RBV reflects a rich industrial 
organization economics heritage, this theory is distinct from other economic theories 
because it is relevant at the firm, not industry level of analysis and because the RBV 
argues that firm resource combinations can result in persistent above-average 
performance (Conner, 1991).
Review of Strategic Groups Research
Economists have long held that performance is essentially an industry construct 
(Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939). Researchers in strategic management, who hold that firm 
differences are critical for understanding performance, have challenged this notion 
(Barney, 1991; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rumelt, 1991). The allure of 
conventional industry analysis has been further tarnished by the introduction o f the 
strategic group concept. SGR originated in Hunt’s (1972) dissertation that found firms in 
the US appliance industry could be grouped based on differences in vertical integration, 
product diversification, and product differentiation. Firms within the industry faced 
different competitive threats depending on group membership. Arising from this early 
work, SGR is based on the premise that profits differ systematically among groups of 
firms within an industry because o f market factors and similar asset profiles that are 
common to groups o f firms (Porter, 1979). Porter (1980: 129) defines a strategic group 
as a “group of firms in an industry following the same or a similar strategy”. Cool and
to
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Schendel (1987: 1106) apply a more general definition and describe strategic groups as 
“firms competing within an industry on the basis of similar resource combinations of 
scope and resource commitments.” Despite differences in semantics, researchers agree 
that strategic groups are naturally occurring subsets o f firms that are more homogeneous 
in actions than other industry incumbents (Cool & Schendel, 1988).
The allure of studying strategic groups is that within an industry some groups may 
consistently outperform others. Indeed, a number o f studies have found evidence for this 
assertion (e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996; Nath & 
Gruca, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993). Group performance is generally attributed to 
strategic group mobility barriers (Porter, 1980). Mobility barriers are structural attributes 
o f the group that make group membership difficult (i.e., costly)(Caves & Porter, 1977). 
Examples include factors such as scale economies, access to distribution channels, or 
advertising and capital intensity at the group level (Porter, 1979). Attaining group 
membership is also difficult because firms within a group are mutually interdependent, 
therefore they anticipate, monitor, and react to fellow group member’s actions accurately 
and quickly relative to non-group members (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Porter, 1979). 
Resource-based vs. Strategic Groups Research: Assumptions and Implications
Before juxtaposing these two theories, it may be useful to contrast their basic 
assumptions (Bacharach, 1989). If the assumptions underlying two theories are 
fundamentally incompatible, any attempt toward pairing the two views is impossible. If 
fundamental assumptions are not at odds, however, pairing the two views can be fruitful 
(Bacharach, 1989). The RBV and SGR are both the offspring o f economic research, and 
they hold similar assumptions in other important areas. First, performance is the key
11
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dependent variable. Second, both perspectives argue that managers aspire to make 
rational decisions. Third, both views argue that superior performance is achieved when 
managers position their firms in such a manner so that strategy imitation is difficult. 
Under the RBV, managers endeavor to create “isolating mechanisms” that protect 
individual firms from imitation and thereby preserve their high performance (Rumelt, 
1984). Under SGR, however, “mobility barriers” serve to separate similar acting groups 
o f firms in an industry (Caves & Porter, 1977; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). The higher 
the mobility barrier, the greater the group’s ability to prevent imitation and the greater the 
potential for high profits by group members (Porter, 1979).
Despite the similarities between the RBV and SGR just mentioned, the 
prescriptive implications of these two views are somewhat at odds. The RBV asserts that 
firms should strive to position themselves in such a manner so that no other firm can 
duplicate their unique resource bundle. In contrast, SGR suggests that commonalties 
across firms can be good. Mutual interdependence among firms may allow insulation 
from rivalry because some groups have superior bargaining power with buyers and 
suppliers, and face less o f a threat from substitute products in other industries (Dranove et 
al., 1998; Porter, 1980). In this view, firm resource bundles will be unique between 
groups, but similar within.
Pairing these two views can be accomplished by examining how managers’ 
choices and actions drive the accumulation o f idiosyncratic firm resources as well as 
decisions about competitive position within a strategic group. While the collective 
beliefs o f organizational members about how a firm is unique can play a critical role in 
organizational interpretations and actions (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton & Dukerich,
12
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1991), managers also perceive and respond to firms that are similar in strategy (Peteraf & 
Shanley, 1997; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Porter, 1980). Thus, both 
individual and group processes may influence interpretations, actions, and outcomes.
While little has been done to conceptually integrate the RBV and SGR, anecdotal 
evidence suggests this pairing is warranted. In particular, the following example 
illustrates how both shared group and unique firm factors play a role in determining firm 
performance. The worldwide auto industry has traditionally been explained in terms of 
individual firm differences within larger groups. The “big three” US automakers are 
commonly referred to as a group in the business press (e.g., Hughes, 1997; Taylor, 1997). 
Compared to foreign automakers, US manufacturers make strategically similar decisions 
in many areas such as the number and types o f suppliers, length o f contracts, supplier 
selection criteria, pricing practices, as well as quality (Cusumano & Takeishi, 1991). 
These group differences have definite implications for firm performance. For example, 
because Japanese automakers have chosen to invest in more specialized assets than their 
American counterparts, they have excelled over the big three in terms of both quality and 
profitability (Dyer, 1996). Despite commonalties among the big three, firms within that 
group can be easily distinguished by their uniqueness. The distinctive competence at 
Chrysler has been engineering (Breer, 1995). Ford has traditionally focused on 
operations (production line) and cost. GM has traditionally outperformed both Chrysler 
and Ford due to benefits from their superior economies o f scale (Porter, 1980). Thus, 
differences in firm resources have served to differentiate automakers and their reputations 
over time (Rao, 1994).
13
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In sum, despite the paucity o f extant theoretical integration, there is evidence to 
suggest that both shared group characteristics as well as unique firm resource differences 
have the ability to lead to superior performance. Indeed, some researchers have 
concluded that significant differences in firm performance can be profiled by examining 
differences within strategic groups (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Lawless, Bergh, & Wilsted, 
1989; Reger & Huff, 1993). Through strategic choices, managers have discretion to 
decide along which dimensions they will be similar to the group and which they will be 
different. Next, I make propositions about how firm resources, strategic group 
characteristics, or both may lead to enhanced performance.
Achieving Superior Performance: Coupling the Two Views
The RBV and SGR both argue that competitive barriers are used to make strategy
duplication more difficult. Examination o f these two independent research streams
reveals that many researchers have unwittingly acted as though the same resources that
are valuable for firms are also valuable for groups. Indeed, empirical investigations of
the RBV and SGR have operationalized the same constructs when attempting to predict
performance differences (Table 1). For example, both Balikrishnan and Fox (1993) and
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) consider a firm’s financial leverage to be a critical
Table 1. Examples of Measures Used to Define Resource-based and Strategic Group 
Uniqueness______________________________________________________________
Measure Resource-based study Strategic group study
Current ratio Schoenecker& Cooper, 1998 Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, & Thomas, 1990
Forecasted growth Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993 Dess & Davis, 1984
Size Hansen & Wemerfelt, 1989 Porter, 1979
Leverage Balikrishnan & Fox, 1993 Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990
R&D intensity Mauri & Michaels, 1998 Hergert, 1987
Capital intensity Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a Hatten & Schendel, 1977
14
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characteristic influencing performance. Depending on philosophical slant, researchers 
have argued that either firm or group is the appropriate level o f  analysis or aggregation. 
Because previous research has been grounded in one perspective, researchers have not 
examined how both firm and group characteristics may affect firm performance.
In the following sections, I elaborate on a number o f situations when firm 
resources, group influences, or both may shape a firm’s actions and performance. 
Providing a thorough pairing o f resource-based and strategic group influences on firm 
performance requires a framework that broadly spans the field of strategic management.
I rely on one provided by Summer and his colleagues (Summer et al., 1990). Their 
conceptual framework circumscribes the field of business policy and strategy by 
including four main components: strategy, leadership and organization, environment, and 
performance (Figure I). Although no universally accepted framework can address every 
aspect o f the field, this scheme was developed by a number of leading scholars in 
strategic management and reflects early influential developments by Coase (1937),
Mason (1939), Bain (1956, 1968), and Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth (1965). 
This framework is used in the following sections to make propositions about how firm 
resources and strategic group characteristics influence and are affected by strategy, 
leadership and organization, and the environment. Notably, these influences have 
implications for firm performance.
Strategy
A firm’s strategy reflects choices about the range of businesses the firm operates 
in and the competitive approach used by these businesses (Porter, 1980; Summer et al.,
1990). Decisions about how the firm chooses to differentiate in a market are reflected in
15
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a firm’s business strategy. The RBV and SGR have tended to focus on different aspects 
o f business level strategy. SGR has been interested in business level strategies that are 
common or generic across firms (Dess & Davis, 1984; Porter, 1979, 1980). In empirical 
investigations, strategic groups researchers have generally focused on commonalties in 
strategically relevant variables that are important for predicting firm performance in 





Figure 1: Influences on firm performance in the field of business policy and 
strategy. Adapted from Summer et al., 1990.
16
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theoretical foundation and little commonality exists in terms o f characteristics that may 
be relevant across industries (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). 
Perhaps general knowledge about groups has been limited because few studies have 
proceeded with an a priori basis for defining unique groups of firms within an industry 
(Ketchen, Thomas, & Snow, 1993). Instead, the majority of studies have inductively 
defined groups based on patterns that emerge from analytical techniques and “assumed” 
these clusters represent a coherent set o f actions and resource commitments that are 
shared by group members (Ketchen et al., 1993). While a few studies have progressed by 
defining groups based on theoretical typologies such as Porter’s generic strategies (e.g., 
Dess & Davis, 1984) or Miles and Snow’s (1978) prospectors, analyzers, ar.d defenders 
(e.g., Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993), these studies have been the exception rather 
than the rule.
The RBV is primarily interested in how firm strategies are idiosyncratic for 
individual firms in an industry (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Peteraf, 1993; 
Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). Although researchers in this scheme do not deny that 
commonalties might exist across groups o f firms, their interests lie in understanding 
business level strategy as a quest for differentiation through unique resource 
accumulation. Consequently, the RBV allows for fine-grained insights about a firm’s 
strategy relative to its competitors (Foss, 1996). The differences that yield superior 
performance are determined by the distinct abilities o f a firm and its management to 
accumulate and implement strategic resources (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; 
Peteraf, 1993; Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). Thus, while generic strategies may be used
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to label a firm’s basic strategic focus, these broad generalizations are not useful for 
understanding differences that lead to a sustained competitive advantage.
A small group of scholars (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1988; Lawless et al., 1989; 
Reger & Huff, 1993) has begun to look for differences inside of strategic groups that may 
lead to performance. These researchers argue that differences within, as well as among 
strategic groups may be critical for superior performance. The idea that certain resources 
are more critical in some strategic groups than in others is consistent with Porter’s (1980) 
view that firm’s will be positioned within their strategic groups based on “structural” 
differences. Thus, both strategic group membership as well as a firm’s specific resource 
endowments have the ability to influence firm performance. If this is truly the case, it 
seems as if an important question of interest to researchers in both views has been long 
overlooked. Namely, what level of analysis -  firm, strategic group or both is responsible 
for influencing firm performance?
Investigations about which level of analysis has the strongest effects on firm 
performance represent an important dialogue in strategic management research. Indeed, 
a strong history in the strategy literature has tested the disparate influences o f firm and 
industry effects to determine which level of analysis is more important for understanding 
firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 1999; Mauri 
& Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert, Phillips, & 
Westfall, 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). This lively debate is apropos in a 
field whose distinctive approach is to examine performance influences from multiple 
levels o f analysis (Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). Given the wealth o f conceptual
18
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evidence that firm’s unique resources as well as strategic group membership have distinct 
performance implications, I propose the following,
Proposition 1: Both strategic group membership and a firm’s resource bundle explain a 
unique component of firm performance variance.
The limited research that has examined both firm uniqueness and similarity to the 
group has tended to frame uniqueness or similarity in black and white terms, where a firm 
is either labeled as representative or deviant from the group’s basic defining traits. 
Specifically, Reger and Huff (1993) make a distinction between “core” firms that closely 
follow the strategic group recipe, and “secondary” firms that follow the recipe more 
loosely. Similarity or uniqueness, however, might be better understood in terms of 
shades of gray where a firm may be representative of the group on one characteristic but 
deviant in another.
Understanding similarity or uniqueness may be furthered by more concise 
definition of the strategic group construct. Within a given industry, it is likely that 
groups of firms may be similar on several characteristics. Only some dimensions, 
however, will be strategically relevant at the group level. Researchers have provided 
several suggestions for improving group definition. Some have argued that strategic 
group definition should be based on a priori, deductively defined theoretical frameworks 
(Dess & Davis, 1984; Ketchen et al., 1993). Others have argued that the link between 
group membership and firm performance be made by measuring unquestionably group 
traits such as group bargaining ability with customers or suppliers (Dranove et al., 1998).
Improving understanding of how group membership influences performance 
allows for incorporation of resource-based explanations. I agree with others who argue 
that group membership should be based on similar actions stemming from group
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processes (Dranove et al., 1998). Within a group, though, differences may exist based on 
the unique accumulation of resources among firms.
Explanation of exactly how strategic group membership might influence resource 
influences on performance has been absent from both literatures. I take the position that 
characteristics o f strategic group membership moderates the relationship between firm 
resources and performance. That is, the ability of resources to enhance firm performance 
is dependent on the core characteristics o f a strategic group.
The following example illustrates how both strategic group and resource-based
explanations can improve understanding o f firm performance. Consider a firm in the
pharmaceutical industry. For some firms in this industry, a capability in research and
development is necessary if  the firm shares membership in a group where high R&D
spending is a core characteristic that defines the group (i.e., it is a mobility barrier).
However, for the firm to achieve differentiation on innovation, it will have to spend more
on R&D than other group members. For example, one relevant characteristic that defines
competition in the pharmaceutical industry is the extent that companies focus on brand
name versus generic drugs. Firms focusing on brand name drugs are likely to be in
strategic groups marked by high mobility barriers in R&D spending in comparison to
firms focusing on the efficient manufacturing of generic drugs. In the case where R&D
expenditures are not a core characteristic o f the group, a firm can spend less to
differentiate itself on R&D within the group. Stated formally,
Proposition 2: Strategic group characteristics moderate the relationship between firm 
resources and performance.
Researchers o f the RBV and SGR have made few prescriptions concerning the 
value that might accrue from holding resources that are similar or unique to other
20
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members in a given strategic group. A starting point for this question may be gained by 
heeding Porter’s (1980) warning that firms not pursuing a clear course of action and 
selecting a viable strategy run the risk of becoming stuck in the middle and experiencing 
poor performance. However, whether a firm becomes “stuck in the middle” or not is 
likely to depend on both the firm’s resource bundles in relation to others in their group. 
Firms must hold and deploy at least the group average of key resources in order to yield 
group average performance. To achieve performance above the group average, firms 
must have additional resources beyond those required for group membership. Additional 
resources enable the firm to differentiate itself from others in the group, allowing for 
enhanced performance.
Proposition 3: Resource accumulation above the group average positively affects firm 
performance.
Leadership and Organization
Skilled top management can be a key resource in obtaining sustained competitive 
advantage for the firm (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). One critical task of strategic leaders is 
setting aspiration levels, or goals, that guide the firm’s resource commitments (Barnard, 
1938; Cyert & March, 1963). These aspirations will in part be determined by the firm’s 
conceptualization of its uniqueness. In this section, I juxtapose the RBV and SGR to 
make propositions concerning how these perspectives in tandem might explain key 
aspects of organizational identities and aspirations.
Identity. Strategic leadership plays a prominent role in shaping organizational 
identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Fiol, 1991). Organizational 
identity consists of the collective beliefs about the organization that are distinctive, 
central, and enduring (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Identity content acts as a perceptual
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lens, influencing organizational issue interpretations and responses (Dutton & Dukerich,
1991). Because one o f the central functions o f top executives is developing a vision and 
sharing that vision with employees (Barnard, 1938; Senge, 1990), top managers are in a 
unique position to develop the organizational identities o f their firms. This is an 
important task because an organization’s identity can serve as a unique resource leading 
to sustainable competitive advantage for firms (Fiol, 1991).
Managers may perceive their firms to have highly unique firm identities (Brown, 
1997; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Fiol, 1991), 
suggesting that they may find little value from group labels imposed by others. Other 
firms, however, hold strong identities as members of a strategic group and adopt a group 
identity (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Similar to organizational identity, Peteraf and 
Shanley (1997: 166) define a strategic group identity as “a set o f  mutual understandings, 
among members of a cognitive intraindustry group, regarding the central, enduring, and 
distinctive characteristics o f the group.” They argue that strategic group identity will be 
strong when groups of firms perform similarly, are geographically close, and share 
network and resource similarities.
Individual firms may have both group identities as well as identities surrounding 
their uniqueness. Albert and Whetten (1985) illustrated the concept of dual identity by 
describing how the modem research university has a normative identity associated with 
the accumulation o f knowledge as well as a utilitarian identity concerned with 
productivity and economic rationality. Important performance implications are 
associated with the strength o f each identity because identity influences organizational 
actions. Within a strategic group, some firms will consistently follow the group recipe,
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closely following similar resource holdings and making similar actions with other “core” 
group members (Reger & Huff, 1993). Other firms, however, will act more as 
“secondary” group members, following the group strategy less consistently. Firms 
holding a strong group identity will likely follow the core strategy of the group, while 
firms without strong groups identities are more likely to act as secondary group members. 
Thus,
Proposition 4: Core strategic group members have stronger group identities than 
secondary group members.
The interpretations that arise from holding an appropriately strong firm or group
identity have important implications for firm performance. Because stable environments
do not necessitate frequent interpretations (Dutton, 1993; Louis & Sutton, 1991), a strong
strategic group identity will likely lead to superior performance as long as the identity
encourages a firm to accumulate resources similar to other members in a high performing
strategic group. In such environments, consistent firm actions may lead to reliable
profits. In contrast, turbulent environments require frequent adjustments (Thomas, 1996).
Holding to a strong group identity may lead to erroneous interpretations as industry
conditions change the competitive landscape (Reger & Palmer, 1996). In turbulent
environments, historical trends and group dynamics are no longer o f value (D’Aveni,
1994). These considerations suggest the following propositions.
Proposition 5: In stable environments, firm performance will be high when both firm and 
group identity are strong.
Proposition 6: In turbulent environments, firm performance will be high when firm 
identity, but not group identity, is strong.
Aspirations. Manager’s mental models are resources that can be a source of
sustained competitive advantage for some firms due to superior creativity, intelligence,
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and strategic planning (Ginsberg, 1994; Senge, 1990). These intellectual resources play a 
part in developing aspirations because they affect management’s propensity to focus on 
certain aspects o f the firm over others (Ocasio, 1997). While most o f the work on 
aspirations has been conducted on individual managers and firms, the strategic group 
literature has the potential to extend our knowledge about how aspirations and goals 
affect performance.
Strategic groups researchers have suggested that perceived membership has 
important implications for firm performance because group membership acts as a 
sensemaking mechanism (Reger & Huff, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Porter, 1980). 
This notion is supported by social psychologists who have long argued that individuals 
have a natural tendency to compare themselves to others they perceive to be similar (e.g., 
Festinger, 1954). As organizational sensemakers, managers may use understandings 
based on a group of firms to navigate their competitive environments (Reger & Palmer, 
1996; Porter, 1980). Hence, managers with a strong strategic group identity may use 
group performance as an aspiration level to guide their firm’s actions (Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1990).
The influence of group association on the sensemaking process has several 
implications for a firm’s strategic actions and resultant performance. Strategic 
reorientation can only occur when a discrepancy exists between manager’s aspirations 
and past performance (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Milliken & Lant, 1991). A strong 
strategic group identity may decrease a firm’s search for new ideas if  group processes, 
interpretations, and actions become habituated within the group. If this is the case, strong 
strategic group identity may lead firms to justify poor performance if  they associate poor
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performance as a group phenomenon. Indeed, empirical evidence supports the notion 
that firms will justify poor performance when it is experienced by other firms they 
perceive to be salient comparators (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992). In this case, an 
individual firm’s aspirations may be lowered by strong group identity.
Strategic group identity may in some cases increase aspirations. If performance is 
below expectations, a firm will experience an attainment discrepancy that will trigger a 
problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963). If this is the case, they may alter their 
resources to improve performance. Aspiration levels may increase if  a firm holds a 
strong identity as a member o f a high performing group. As the firm raises their 
aspirations to match the performance of others in the groups, the firm will also 
necessarily alter resources to follow the group strategy. These actions have the potential 
to increase firm performance. Stated formally,
Proposition 7: Strategic group identity strength influences aspirations.
Environment
When attempting to understand the determinants of firm performance, research in 
strategic management has been built on the assumption that environmental influences 
play a significant role in performance achievement and sustainability (Child, 1972; Dess, 
Ireland, & Hitt, 1990; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Meyer, 1991; Porter, 1980; Summer et 
al., 1990). In the field of strategic management, the industry environment has 
undoubtedly been the most investigated environmental aspect (Wiersema & Bantel,
1993). Economists have long theorized that industry differences influence organizational 
performance (e.g., Bain, 1956), and strategists have identified multiple dimensions that 
differentiate industries (cf. Dess & Beard, 1984; Porter, 1980).
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While numerous environmental aspects can be identified, Dess and Beard (1984) 
argue that three critical aspects capture the essence of the industry environment: 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity. These characteristics have been widely used in 
empirical operationalizations o f the environment (e.g., Dess et al., 1990; Keats & Hitt, 
1988; Lawless & Finch, 1989; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; 
Weinzimmer, Nystrom, & Freeman, 1998). Thus, I make propositions based on each of 
these industry dimensions.
Munificence. Munificence is the extent to which environmental resources are
available and accessible to firms (Aldrich, 1979; Starbuck, 1976). While munificence
should be positively related to performance for all firms in an industry (Porter, 1980;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), degree of industry munificence may favor some strategic
groups over others (Ketchen et al., 1993). Munificence will enable groups of firms with
certain strategic characteristics to benefit over other groups because of the role resource
accumulation plays in their strategy. For example, firms that operate in a broad domain
will likely benefit from the abundance of resources present in a growing industry
(Carroll, 1984). In contrast, low environmental munificence should favor firms in
strategic groups favoring a more specialized strategic focus (Ketchen et al., 1993). Lack
o f munificence generates limited organizational slack (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), thus
firms postured to accumulate specific resources are more adept to navigate through
environments characterized by low growth. Thus, industry munificence moderates the
effect of strategic group characteristics on firm performance. Stated formally,
Proposition 8: Industry munificence moderates the relationship between strategic group 
characteristics and firm performance.
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Dynamism. Dynamism refers to environmental changes that are difficult to 
predict in terms of both frequency and direction. Because dynamic environments expose 
decision makers to considerable uncertainty (Dess & Beard, 1984; Jurkovich, 1974), 
average firm performance suffers (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Individual firms, 
however, can increase performance when they are positioned in strategic groups that are 
relatively buffered from the uncertainty. Indeed, Ketchen and colleagues (1993) found 
that strategic groups that were positioned to quickly adjust product offerings in response 
to changing demand characteristics outperformed groups that lacked this capability.
Environmental dynamism may also have important implications for a firm’s 
resource decisions within a group. Dynamism has been found to moderate the 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance (Li & Simerly, 1998), 
strategy consensus and firm performance (Homburg, Krohmer, & Workman, 1999), and 
rational decision making and firm performance (Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995). Thus 
considerable evidence exists suggesting dynamism will affect several aspects associated 
with managerial habits and abilities, which are critical resources in dynamic 
environments. Other resources will also be affected by industry dynamism. For 
example, in Miller and Shamsie’s (1996) study of Hollywood film studios they found that 
different resources led to financial performance in the stable, predictable environment of 
1936-1950 than in the more uncertain environment o f 1951-1965. In a dynamic market, 
performance will be enhanced when a firm can quickly gather resources necessary to 
achieve competitive advantage by reducing uncertainty. In sum, both group 
characteristics as well as firm capabilities both have the ability to lead to superior 
performance in dynamic environments. Stated formally,
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Proposition 9a: In dynamic environments, high performance is a function o f a firm’s 
ability to quickly access valuable, rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable resources based on 
a firm’s unique capabilities
Proposition 9b: In dynamic environments, high performance is a function o f a firm’s 
ability to quickly access valuable, rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable resources based on 
capabilities derived from strategic group membership.
Proposition 9c: The degree o f environmental dynamism will moderate the importance of 
a firm’s unique resources on performance.
Complexity. Complexity is characterized by the number and diversity of 
competitors, suppliers, buyers, and other environmental actors that firm decision makers 
need to consider when formulating strategy (Bourgeois, 1980; Dess & Beard, 1984). As 
environmental complexity increases, so does industry rivalry and competition. The idea 
that industry competition shapes firms’ strategies and capabilities is well documented in 
the literature of economics as well as both the ecological and strategy traditions. Despite 
adequate conceptual grounding, few scholars have linked competitive influences to the 
actions of firms and groups (Henderson & Mitchell, 1997).
Perhaps the lack o f interface between firms, groups, and environments is a 
function of the strategy field’s strong reliance on economic theory. Traditional economic 
thought has generally focused on one aspect of the competitive environment —  industry 
concentration — and asserted that on average, firm performance is higher in highly 
concentrated industries (e.g., Bain, 1956, 1959; Caves, 1972; Koch, 1974; Mann, 1966). 
The basic logic underlying this argument does not deny that resource differences may 
differentiate competitors in consolidated industries, but rather asserts that firms in 
concentrated industries have little incentive to engage in competitive actions because 
mutual interdependence encourages higher prices and profits for all industry incumbents 
(Porter, 1980).
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Degree o f industry complexity plays an important role in determining how a 
firm’s unique resource bundles as well as strategic group characteristics play a role in 
determining firm performance. Complex environments involve considerable variety in 
the number and diversity o f strategic groups within an industry (Miles, Snow, & 
Sharman, 1993). Thus, considerable differences should exist in the mobility barriers and 
other characteristics that differentiate strategic groups and their members. In industries 
marked by high industry complexity, strategic group membership will likely have 
important implications for firm performance because there is great diversity in mobility 
barriers leading some groups to outperform others. In less complex industries, however, 
mobility barriers are generally high for all industry incumbents (Porter, 1980). In these 
industries, which tend to be more consolidated, all of the firms that exist in the industry 
must be able to overcome high mobility barriers. Firms in less complex industries are 
likely to be at the later stages o f the industry life cycle (Porter, 1980), suggesting that 
they show less strategic variety (Miles et al., 1993). Thus, it is likely that a firm’s unique 
resources rather than characteristics o f the strategic group will play a more important role 
in determining firm performance.
Proposition 10: As industry complexity increases, a firm’s unique resources will play 
more of a role in determining firm performance than strategic group characteristics.
Future Research Implications and Conclusions
I have made the argument that efforts to achieve superior performance will be 
aided by considering both firm resources and strategic group influences. Both 
practitioners as well as researchers stand to gain from integrating and acknowledging that 
both unique firm characteristics and group influences play a critical role in resource 
accumulations, allocations, and ultimately outcomes. In the following sections I outline
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implications for practitioners and also make suggestions for combining elements from the 
RBV and SGR in future theoretical treatise as well as empirical tests.
Implications for Organizational Decision Makers
To achieve above average performance in today’s hypercompetitive environment, 
managers must analyze and understand complex relationships surrounding their resources 
as well as the resource bundles o f their competitors. A rich history in strategic 
management has aided in helping managers produce a fit between their firm’s unique 
strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities and threats that exist in the environment. 
A combined knowledge of a firm’s unique resources as well as any advantage of strategic 
group membership is necessary to fully understand firm positioning in the environment. 
Although every firm is ultimately unique, recognition o f similar acting groups of firms 
can be invaluable when conducting competitive analysis (Porter, 1980).
To achieve superior performance managers must constantly reanalyze when 
unique firm resources or shared strategic group characteristics are more critical to 
achieving superior performance. As I have argued, in many cases both will be critical for 
long term competitive advantage. For example, in the late 1980s the US semiconductor 
industry was dramatically losing market share to foreign competitors. To ameliorate this 
trend, a group of firms in this industry pooled resources to effectively mount an attack 
against global competitors (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995). This cooperation acted 
as a source of competitive advantage for the firms in this group. Unique firm 
characteristics, however, continued to be critical. While maintaining the benefits o f this 
group effort, Intel gained additional competitive advantage by differentiating their firm 
on branding and marketing, as well as quality (D’ Aveni, 1994). As Intel’s experience
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suggests, managers should carefully examine when unique firm resources, strategic group 
characteristics, or both can lead to competitive advantage.
Managers must also incorporate firm resources and strategic group characteristics 
when developing their corporate level strategy. Indeed, a considerable amount of 
research has already adopted a RBV of corporate strategy (e.g., Markides & Williamson, 
1994, 1996; Montgommery & Wemerfelt, 1988; Peteraf, 1993). The RBV provides 
insights into effective corporate level strategy by suggesting that managers pursuing 
related diversification may encounter enhanced performance when their diversification 
efforts allow a business to obtain valuable, rare, imperfectly tradable and costly to imitate 
resources (Markides & Williamson, 1996). Little guidance, however, has been given on 
how strategic groups might influence corporate strategy because the strategic group 
concept has been focused largely on business level strategy. Consequently, few studies 
have examined diversified firms. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests an increasing 
role played by strategic groups on corporate strategy. For example, AT&T’s highly 
touted acquisition into the cable television market has encouraged other 
telecommunications firms to diversify into this industry. Hence, when considering a 
strategic acquisition, managers should be aware of any strategic group characteristics that 
may enhance or detract from the attractiveness o f their potential acquisitions. Clearly, 
managers diversification decisions will be improved when they consider both unique firm 
and group influences that will allow them to posture their firm to achieve competitive 
advantage and superior performance.
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Implications for Theory Building
Integration of the RBV and SGR should prove fruitful, especially for building 
theory surrounding corporate level strategy. For example, diversification has 
considerable implications for corporate performance and remains one of the central topics 
of interest in strategic management research (Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson, 1998). 
Researchers attempting to incorporate information integrating firm resources and 
strategic group characteristics into corporate level strategy formulations might begin by 
drawing on research in strategic networks. Network researchers have begun to integrate 
the RBV into their conceptual frameworks by arguing that managers can create value for 
their firms by integrating their resources in network relationships with other suppliers, 
customers, or distributors that enable value to be added to their firm (Gulati, 1999;
Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). The effect of bargaining power o f groups of firms in strategic 
networks may also play a substantial role in improving firm performance.
Managers create networks by engaging in strategic alliances or acquisitions. 
Inasmuch as corporations follow similar acquisition strategies to achieve superior 
network structures, strategic groups within a given industry may also become a factor.
As a number of corporations engage in multipoint competition by diversifying into the 
same markets following the same strategy, the content o f strategic groups in an industry 
may be altered. Important performance implications can be drawn from such actions. 
Corporations that diversify by acquiring a firm in an attractive strategic group will likely 
improve their performance. On the contrary, corporations that acquire a firm in an 
unattractive strategic group may watch their corporation’s performance erode.
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Manager’s diversification decisions are driven by their ideas of relatedness 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), which can be conceptualized in many ways (Stimpert & 
Duhaime, 1997b). Future theoretical research should investigate how unique firm 
resources and strategic group membership affect manager’s cognitions and thus influence 
corporate diversification decisions. For example, holding a strong unique firm identity 
may discourage some corporations from making acquisitions in some strategic groups 
because they would consider these acquisitions to be inconsistent with their 
conceptualizations of relatedness. As well, managers o f firms with low levels o f 
diversification may be tempted to make acquisitions of firms that operate in strategic 
groups similar to their dominate business. In contrast, managers of highly diversified 
firms will probably not be biased in this fashion.
The pairing o f the RBV and SGR offers many additional opportunities for 
theoretical integration. For example, how do individual firm resource choices affect the 
structure o f the strategic group over time? When is it advisable for an individual firm to 
enter or leave a group? Can individual firms achieve a sustainable competitive advantage 
by creating unique isolating mechanisms at one point in time, and collaborating to form 
group entry barriers at other time points? Many fruitful investigations considering both 
firm resources and strategic group characteristics remain.
Implications for Theory Testing
Our knowledge of firm resource and strategic group influences on performance 
can be furthered by rigorous empirical tests incorporating elements from both o f these 
views. The differing theoretical bases underlying the RBV and SGR have historically 
lead to distinct research strategies. Because the RBV assumes heterogeneity in resources
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and performance, studies of this view have logically relied on regression analysis in 
empirical investigations (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). In contrast, SGR generally 
has assumed homogeneity among group members and explored systematic differences in 
group performance. Under this view, empirical investigation has used a variety o f 
methods to cluster firms into groups (Ketchen & Shook, 1996), and then examine group 
differences (i.e., main effects o f group characteristics on performance) using 
ANOVA/MANOVA techniques (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1990, 1995; Lewis & Thomas, 1990). In this section, I provide guidance for researchers 
with the hope that they will include elements from both the RBV as well as SGR into 
future empirical tests.
Essentially, a level of analysis debate has hindered empirical integration of these 
two views. The RBV argues that firms are the appropriate unit o f analysis, while 
strategic groups researchers propose group level investigation is warranted. If both views 
have merit, then previous research has made a number o f theoretical and methodological 
errors. For example, if groups have an influence on individual performance, studies 
conducted solely at the individual level o f analysis have violated the independence of 
observations assumption that underlies traditional statistical approaches (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). If individuals have an influence on performance, 
studies examining only group influences on performance have discarded potentially 
meaningful lower level variance (Hofmann, 1997). If both influence firm performance, 
researchers have failed to investigate substantive research questions such as which level 
accounts for more variance in firm performance.
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It is notable that this level o f analysis debate is familiar to other disciplines that 
engage in organizational research. In the organizational behavior literature, studies of 
work group applications have similarly endeavored to understand which level of analysis 
(i.e., individual or group) more strongly influences individual performance (Hofmann, 
1997). Across disciplines, educational researchers have faced similar challenges when 
determining if child, class, or school is the best level to investigate when attempting to 
predict academic performance (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Within our own field, a 
lively debate continues to test whether firm or industry accounts for more variance in 
firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; 
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; 
Schmalensee, 1985). The strategic group level of analysis, however, has been ignored in 
such studies. Thus, our understanding of how firms, strategic groups, and industries 
influence firm performance has been limited.
To empirically test resource-based and strategic group influences on firm 
performance, researchers should endeavor to employ techniques that allow testing of 
multiple levels of analysis simultaneously (Dranove et al., 1998; Rouse & Daeilenbach, 
1999). Within the last decade, statistical developments from other fields have allowed 
for the introduction o f hierarchical linear modeling techniques that are appropriate for 
analyzing data at multiple levels o f analysis. These techniques are well documented in 
the education literature (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), and have recently emerged in the 
management literature as well (e.g., Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Kidwell, 
Mossholder, & Bennett, 1997). These techniques hold great promise for researchers in 
strategic management.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Several additional issues are worth noting. When combining the two views, 
sample selection will likely play a role in substantive research conclusions. Because 
research in strategic groups has often studied a single industry with single business 
competitors, initial studies combining these two views should rely on rich investigations 
o f firm resources and strategic group characteristics in a single industry setting composed 
o f single business firms (Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). An ideal setting for initial 
investigations would be an industry where there is previous theoretical and empirical 
evidence that strategic groups exist. Following formative inquiries concerning firm and 
group performance affects, researchers should attempt to establish generalizability by 
relying on multiple industry designs.
Another thorny methodological issue that arises when pairing these two views 
concerns how to handle diversified firms. While pioneering efforts to understand firm 
and group influences would be well advised to control for diversification by sampling 
from single business firms, ultimately diversification should be modeled and the efficacy 
of corporate resource bundles on performance can be assessed to understand firm 
performance (Markides & Williamson, 1996).
Conclusion
The RBV and SGR have largely ignored each other in relation to many relevant 
strategic issues that have important implications for firm performance. A more realistic 
picture can be seen when researchers acknowledge and investigate influences that occur 
both within and between groups. Both theoretical developments and empirical 
investigations stand to gain when insights and ideas stemming from both o f these two 
views are acknowledged.
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RESOURCE-BASED AND STRATEGIC GROUP INFLUENCES ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Predicting firm performance continues to top many strategic management scholars 
research agendas (March & Sutton, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). To 
accomplish this goal, strategy researchers have incorporated insights from numerous 
disciplines such as economics, administrative management, psychology, and marketing 
(Biggadike, 1981; Jemison, 1981a, 1981b; Porter, 1981). This blending of multiple 
perspectives to answer practical research questions such as the determinants of firm 
performance is one o f the key qualities that distinguishes the field from related 
disciplines (Meyer, 1991).
Although rich conceptual integration has been encouraged in much strategy 
research, two key perspectives in the field — the resource-based view o f the firm and 
strategic groups research — have largely ignored each other concerning how firms 
achieve superior performance (e.g., Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Reger & 
Huff, 1993; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). The resource-based view o f  the firm  (RBV) 
argues that differences in firm resources and capabilities provide the basis for superior 
firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984). From this perspective, performance is a 
function of manager’s ability to acquire and deploy the resources needed to achieve 
sustained competitive advantage for their organization. Strategic groups research (SGR) 
focuses on sets o f firms within the same industry that follow similar strategies (Cool & 
Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979,1980; Reger & 
Huff, 1993; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). Membership in a strategic group can be an 
important contextual influence, altering interpretations, actions, and ultimately
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performance (Dranove et al., 1998; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993).
Under this view, firms need not be uniquely different in their resources and actions from 
all the industry’s incumbents. Rather, similarity may be advantageous for some firms.
If both of these views have merit, then previous research relying on one 
perspective to the exclusion o f the other has both theoretical as well as methodological 
limitations. Conceptually, overlooking one view in favor o f the other ignores a 
significant line of research that has been supported in the literature. Methodologically, a 
level o f analysis issue also confounds interpretation o f previous empirical research. For 
example, if groups have an influence on individual performance, studies conducted solely 
at the individual level of analysis have violated the independence of observations 
assumption that underlies traditional statistical approaches (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; 
Hofmann, 1997). If individual firm resources have an influence on performance, then 
studies examining only group influences on performance have discarded potentially 
meaningful lower level variance (Hofmann, 1997). Subsequently, some researchers have 
argued for a test of the effect o f strategic group characteristics on firm performance that 
controls for the effects o f firm resources (Dranove et al., 1998). As well, empirical 
investigations of resource-based and strategic group explanations should use a single 
industry to control for industry attributes that affect strategic decisions (Rouse & 
Daellenbach, 1999). Such a test would increase the rigor over previous research, and 
serve to integrate SGR with the conceptual foundation o f the RBV.
When used in isolation each o f these two perspectives provides an incomplete 
picture o f why some firms outperform others. Hence, simultaneous consideration o f the 
RBV and SGR has the potential to yield considerable insights about how firms can
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achieve superior performance within their competitive environments (Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). In this paper, I test the influences o f firm 
resources and strategic group membership on firm performance in a single model. By 
investigating firm resource and strategic group influences on firm performance 
simultaneously, this paper works towards integration of these two perspectives’ disparate 
insights.
Literature Review
Although the RBV and SGR approaches to achieving superior performance are 
both based in part by research within economics, they differ considerably in terms of the 
managerial actions taken to enhance organizational performance. In the following 
sections I briefly review the literature on both of these views, focusing on their separate 
insights for achieving superior firm performance.
Review of the Resource Based Perspective
The central tenet o f the RBV is that firm profitability is a function o f an 
organization’s unique resource bundles (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984). Resources are 
broadly defined to encompass specific assets as well as human competencies and 
intangible abilities (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Under the RBV, the performance of an 
individual firm is a function o f managers’ rational attempts to enhance efficiency, 
effectiveness, and performance by accumulating and deploying scarce resources (Conner, 
1991; Oliver, 1997). Ideally, managers will strive to accumulate resources that are 
valuable, rare, without substitutes, and bundled in a manner so that the firm’s resources, 
and thus strategies, are inimitable by current and future competitors (Barney, 1991).
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Attaining such resources involves overcoming significant acquisition barriers (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959). Thus, managers who are able to 
overcome these barriers place their organizations in a desirable competitive position.
The RBV has emerged as a central perspective in strategic management, 
providing a common thread in a field that has historically lacked a distinct paradigm 
(Conner, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Wemerfelt, 1995). The RBV 
has aided improved understanding of diversification (Markides & Williamson, 1996), 
human resource systems (Lado & Wilson, 1994), organizational culture (Barney, 1986a; 
Fiol, 1991), strategic networks (Gulati, 1999), strategic regulation (Maijoor & Van 
Witteloostuijn, 1996) in addition to firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993;
Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Although the RBV has become a cornerstone for building understandings about 
competitive advantage in the field o f strategic management (Peteraf, 1993), the basis for 
this perspective is by no means novel. Economists have long relied on a similar concept 
of Ricardian rents that can be generated from ownership of valuable land, labor, capital, 
and entrepreneurial abilities (Ricardo, 1817). The RBV is also similar to SWOT analysis 
in which strategy formulation progresses by analyzing the “fit” between a firm’s 
positioning o f its internal strengths and weaknesses with the environment’s external 
opportunities and threats (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980). Originating at the 
Harvard Business School, this ‘design’ school of thought is based on the premise that 
firms are idiosyncratic (Mintzberg, 1990). Hence, understanding the determinants o f firm 
performance can best be accomplished by analysis that focuses on a firm’s unique 
resources and capabilities.
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In sum, the RBV assumes firm performance is a function o f holding and 
deploying unique resources. Desiring to equip their firms with scarce resources that will 
lead to superior performance, managerial choices drive the resource accumulation 
process. This view is well documented in the strategic management literature, and draws 
from classic economic thought as well. Although the RBV reflects a rich industrial 
organization economics heritage, this theory is distinct from other economic views 
because it is relevant at the firm, not industry, level of analysis and because the RBV 
argues that firm resource combinations can result in persistent above-average 
performance (Conner, 1991).
Review of Strategic Groups Research
The concept of the strategic group first originated with Hunt (1972), who 
observed distinct sets of firms in the major home appliance industry. Although Hunt 
focused primarily on the structure within industries, Newman (1973) provided evidence 
that differences in behavior across groups led to performance differences among groups. 
The most compelling conceptual foundation for the strategic groups -  performance link 
was laid by the work o f Porter (Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979, 1980), who argued 
that differences among groups in factors such as marketing methods, technologies, and 
capital requirements resulted in “mobility barriers” that insulated group members from 
potential group entrants.
Empirical work on strategic groups began to blossom in the late 1970s and 
continues to flourish. Despite considerable grounding conceptually as well as 
empirically, though, the evidence that group membership influences firm performance 
has been equivocal to date. While the link between group membership and performance
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has been supported in numerous empirical studies (e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Fiegenbaum 
& Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996; Nath & Gruca, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993), others fail to 
establish such a link (e.g., Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Cool & Schendel, 1988). 
Differences in individual study outcomes may be attributable to numerous factors such as 
how variables used to define strategic direction are operationalized (McGee & Thomas, 
1986), how strategic group membership is conceptualized (Ketchen et al., 1993), and how 
researchers “cluster” firms into groups empirically (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). Across 
studies, though, a meta-analytic review of the literature found that 8% of the variance in 
firm performance can be attributed to group membership (Ketchen et al., 1997).
Managerial actions are critical in determining firm performance within a group. 
Because firms within a group are mutually interdependent, managers within a group are 
more able to anticipate, monitor, and react to fellow group member’s actions more 
accurately and quickly than non-group members (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Mutual 
understandings among group members about the central, enduring characteristics of the 
group constitute a strategic group identity that has the potential to lead to both positive 
and negative firm level outcomes (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Thus, both cognitive 
understandings as well as objective structural differences play a role in linking group 
membership to performance.
Relating the Resource-based View and Strategic Groups Research
The RBV and SGR have emerged as two o f the most investigated conceptual 
frameworks for analyzing firm performance differences in the strategy literature. Despite 
continuing interest in these theories, conceptual integration o f these two views is lacking 
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). The most marked difference between these views is found
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in their divergent prescriptive implications. The RBV asserts that firms should strive to 
position themselves in such a manner so that no other firm can duplicate their unique 
resource bundle, while SGR suggests that mutual interdependence among firms may 
allow insulation from rivalry because some groups have superior bargaining power with 
buyers and suppliers, and face less o f a threat from substitute products in other industries 
(Dranove et al., 1998; Porter, 1979). Thus, SGR argues that some determinants of firm 
performance are unique between groups, but similar within.
Pairing these two views can be accomplished by examining how managers’ 
choices and actions drive the accumulation of idiosyncratic firm resources as well as 
decisions about competitive position within a strategic group. While the collective 
beliefs o f organizational members about how a firm is unique can play a critical role in 
organizational interpretations and actions (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991), managers also perceive and respond to firms that are similar in strategy (Peteraf & 
Shanley, 1997; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Porter, 1980). Thus, both 
individual and group processes may influence interpretations, actions, and outcomes. In 
sum, despite the paucity of extant theoretical integration, there is evidence to suggest that 
both shared group characteristics as well as unique firm resource differences have the 
ability to lead to superior performance.
Hypotheses
In the following sections, 1 elaborate how firm resources, group influences, or 
both may shape manager’s actions and organizational performance. Specifically, I make 
hypotheses about how the RBV and SGR may together improve understanding o f the 
effects o f  strategic actions on organizational performance.
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Contributions of Group Membership and Firm Uniqueness on Performance
A firm’s strategy reflects choices about the range of businesses the firm operates 
in and the competitive approach used by these businesses (Porter, 1980; Summer et al., 
1990). The RBV and SGR have tended to focus on different aspects o f business level 
strategy. SGR has been interested in business level strategies that are common or generic 
across firms (Dess & Davis, 1984; Porter, 1979, 1980). In empirical investigations, SGR 
has focused on commonalties in strategically relevant variables that are important for 
predicting firm performance in specific industries.
The RBV is primarily interested in how firm strategies are idiosyncratic for 
individual firms in an industry (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Peteraf, 1993; 
Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). Although researchers in this scheme do not deny that 
commonalties might exist across groups of firms, their interests lie in understanding 
business level strategy as a quest for differentiation through unique resource 
accumulation. Consequently, the RBV allows for fine-grained insights about a firm’s 
strategy relative to competitors (Foss, 1996). The differences that yield superior 
performance are determined by the distinct abilities o f a firm and its management to 
accumulate and implement strategic resources (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; 
Peteraf, 1993; Schoenecher & Cooper, 1998). Thus, while generic strategies may be used 
to label a firm’s basic strategic focus, these broad generalizations are not useful for 
understanding differences that lead to a sustained competitive advantage.
Recent work in SGR has begun to bridge the gap between these two theories by 
acknowledging that differences in firm strategies and performance may exist both within 
and between strategic groups (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Indeed, Lawless, Bergh, and
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Wilsted (1989) used separate analysis for group and firm influences on performance to 
conclude that both group characteristics and firm capabilities influenced firm 
performance. Reger and Huff (1993) argued that any given strategic group contains 
“core” members who compete by closely following the basic recipe that defines the 
strategic group, as well as “secondary” group members who loosely follow the group 
recipe (Reger & Huff, 1993). Thus, elements o f both group membership and unique firm 
characteristics may influence performance.
If both firm uniqueness as well a group membership influence performance, an 
important question of interest to researchers in both views has been long overlooked. 
Namely, what level of analysis -  firm, strategic group, or both, is most responsible for 
influencing firm performance? Investigations about level of analysis effects on firm 
performance represent an important dialogue in strategic management research. Indeed, 
a strong history in the strategy literature has tested the disparate influences of firm and 
industry effects to determine which level of analysis is more important for understanding 
firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; 
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; 
Schmalensee, 1985). This lively debate is apropos in a field whose distinctive approach 
is to examine performance influences spanning multiple levels o f analysis (Meyer, 1991; 
Summer et al., 1990).
Decomposing variance into organizational and group levels may further our 
understanding or resource-based and strategic group influences on performance. When 
examined together, several possibilities exist. For example, it could be that little variance 
exists at the group level, setting the value of strategic groups research as suspect. In
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contrast, the majority of the variation in performance could be between groups with little 
variation within. Such a finding would question the merit o f the resource-based 
explanations. Given the wealth of conceptual evidence that firm’s unique resources as 
well as strategic group membership have distinct performance implications, I hypothesize 
the following,
Hypothesis 1: Both strategic group membership and a firm’s unique resource bundle 
explain a unique component of firm performance variance.
The Effect of Group and Organizational Characteristics on Performance
While understanding the extent to which firms or strategic groups explain 
variation in firm performance can provide a valuable contribution to the literature, further 
insights can be gained by understanding how variables at each level o f analysis influence 
performance. O f specific interest is the influence o f strategic group membership on 
performance. Strategic groups researchers have implicitly argued for a direct link 
between group membership and performance. Group membership in and of itself, 
however, is not directly responsible for differentiating groups in terms o f performance. 
Instead, it is likely that persistent structural features such as mobility barriers in certain 
key areas make group membership more attractive in some groups over others (Caves & 
Porter, 1977; Dranove et al., 1998; Mehra, 1996). Other specific group traits might 
include group bargaining ability (Dranove et al., 1998), or a strong group reputation or 
image (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Thus, the advantage of group membership is a 
function of specific characteristics that exist solely at the group level o f analysis. These 
characteristics have been labeled as strategic industry factors, or resources that are 
valuable within an industry (as opposed to idiosyncratic resources) (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Mehra, 1996). Such characteristics are a distinct function o f group processes and
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actions, beyond any action taken by individual actors within the group. Researchers have 
argued that if  such group processes truly exists, then their effects should be detected after 
controlling for possible resource influences (Dranove et al., 1998). Hence, I propose the 
following:
Hypothesis 2: Strategic group characteristics have a direct (i.e., main) effect on firm 
performance above and beyond that accounted for by firm resources.
Strategic Group Characteristics Moderate Firm Resources Effects on Performance
Group membership may also have an indirect affect on firm performance by 
changing the nature o f the relationship between firm resources and performance within a 
group. The idea that certain resources are more critical in some strategic groups than in 
others is consistent with Porter’s (1980) view that firm’s will be positioned within their 
strategic groups based on “structural” differences. While all firms within a strategic 
group may receive some benefit from group membership, resource heterogeneity may 
influence within group performance differences (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Indeed, Reger 
and Huff (1993) found that firms closely representing the group’s “core” defining traits 
outperformed firms following the group recipe less consistently. This notion is backed 
by considerable theoretical and empirical evidence stemming from the resource-based 
view that differences in firm resources and assets are critical determinants o f firm 
performance differences (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Lawless et al., 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984).
Despite conceptual and empirical evidence that both firm resources as well as 
group characteristics influence firm performance, little guidance has been given about the 
form o f the relationship between resources, strategic group membership, and 
performance. I take the position that strategic group membership moderates the
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relationship between firm resources and performance. That is, characteristics o f the 
group alter the efficacy o f firm resources to enhance performance. For example, firms 
overcoming substantial mobility barriers in marketing and R&D to position themselves 
into a group will likely find it even more difficult to differentiate their firms from other 
group members on these characteristics. Stated formally,




A sample was drawn from the U.S. healthcare industry. The use o f the healthcare 
industry was attractive for several reasons. First, a single industry is desirable to provide 
a rich analysis o f how firm resources and strategic group characteristics influence firm 
performance in a well-documented context (cf. Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). Indeed, the 
existence of strategic groups has been well documented in this industry (Ketchen et al., 
1993; Pegels & Sekar, 1989; Shortell, Morrison, & Friedman, 1990; Zajac & Shortell, 
1989). Finally, hospitals are critical components of the healthcare industry, a segment of 
the U.S. economy that accounts for approximately 15% of the country’s gross domestic 
product (Beekun Stedham, & Young, 1998).
To capture this competitive environment I further constrain my sample to a single 
metropolitan area. Sampling from a single geographic region is recommended when 
studying the health care industry, because there is evidence that competition within this 
industry is geographically based (Chiswick, 1976; Hambrick, 1982; Nath & Sudharshan, 
1994). I obtained data from the Center for Health Care Industry Performance Studies, 
and from the Guide to the Health Care Field o f the American Hospital Association.
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Data were collected from the years 1988-92 from an entire population o f 86 
hospitals in a large metropolitan area in the northeastern United States (excluding 
Veterans’ Administration hospitals, military-base hospitals, and university health 
centers). The years 1988-1992 were chosen to examine an environment that would be 
characterized by heavy competition for resources and diversity in the actions of 
environmental actors. This was the case among hospitals beginning in the late 1980s. 
Before 1986, most hospitals were reimbursed the full cost of patient care from third-party 
payers. However, after 1986 the Medicare Prospective Payment System was fully 
implemented, and hospitals were only reimbursed based on predetermined levels based 
on the medical condition treated. Thus, while hospitals once had the ability to generate 
profits by discretionary pricing policies, after 1986 hospitals needed to provide their 
services below the price limits to be profitable. The decision to use 1988 as the starting 
point of data collection is critical, because this represented the period of time 
immediately following the implementation of the new Medicare Prospective Payment 
System.
To enhance my ability to make causal inferences about multilevel influences on 
organizational performance, I used a lagged structure (Beekun et al., 1998; Palmer & 
Wiseman, 1999). Resources and strategic group characteristics were taken from the years 
1988-1990, and performance measurements were taken from the years 1990-1992. Three 
years of organizational resource and performance data are needed to provide stable 
measures of organizational resources and performance (cf. Beekun et al, 1998; Keats & 
Hitt, 1988). One year of data overlap is chosen because some resources will have
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immediate effects on performance, while other resources may take a number of years 
before their performance affects are fully realized (cf. Palmer & Wiseman, 1999).
Firm Resource Measures
A number of organizational resource categorizations have been presented in the 
literature (Black & Boal, 1994). I use the classification o f Chatteijee and Wemerfelt 
(1991), which places organizational resources into three categories: physical, intangible, 
and financial. This classification is well grounded in the literature (e.g., MacDonald, 
1984; Montgommery & Hariharan, 1990; Teece, 1982) and remains a popular resource 
classification framework (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). To operationalize 
organizational resources, I select two measures from each of these categories.
Physical resources. Physical resources embody the firm’s physical technology, 
plant and equipment, geographic location, and access to raw materials (Barney, 1991). I 
use several measures to operationalize this construct. First, 1 use a measure of capital 
investment, or funds spent to improve the firm’s facilities. A firm that makes a consistent 
commitment in capital expenditures is continually building their property, plant and 
equipment. As well, capital investment is a resource allocation that has been shown to 
have a strong relationship with firm performance across studies (e.g., Capon, Farley, & 
Hoenig, 1990; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). Finally, capital investment represents an 
important strategic decision in the hospital industry (Beekun et al., 1998). To indicate 
capital investment I collected data on the total spending on buildings and fixtures 
measured in millions of dollars. In addition, I used an indicator variable to measure if  the 
hospital was in an urban or suburban location. Location in the hospital industry can be a
50
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
critical resource effecting access to both customers and employees (Nath & Sudharshan,
1994).
Intangible resources. Intangible resources are assets and skills that are generally 
a function o f human innovation or entrepreneurial ability (Michalisin, Smith, & Kline, 
1997). To measure intangible resources for hospitals, I use the amount of direct medical 
education, defined as intern and resident salaries plus other direct costs divided by the 
number of full-time interns and residents (cf. Ketchen et al., 1993). Hospitals that wish 
to adopt a new technology must have qualified personnel to ensure that their technology 
is used both efficiently and effectively. Hospitals that spend more on direct medical 
education are making a commitment towards having a highly trained workforce capable 
of utilizing the most up to date technological healthcare equipment (Ketchen et al., 1993). 
Also, the amount spent on direct medical education plays an important role in influencing 
a hospital’s reputation. Direct medical education expenses are measured in thousands of 
dollars. I supplement this measure with organizational age. Unique historical conditions 
can be a source of competitive advantage for firms (Barney, 1991). Hospitals that have 
been operating longer have accumulated intangible knowledge and experience gleaned 
from many years o f operations into their culture and identity. As well, age has been 
identified by others as a factor that influences the type of strategy pursued by health care 
organizations (Beekun et al., 1998; Topping & Hernandez, 1991).
Financial resources. Financial resources enhance competitive advantage because 
they represent the ability and likelihood of competitive response (Bourgeois, 1981).
Firms with available financial resources may experiment with new product offerings, and 
engage in a host o f  actions that would otherwise be constrained (Moses, 1992;
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Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). To measure financial resources, I use the current ratio, 
defined as current assets divided by current liabilities. I chose this measure because it is 
common to studies o f both firm resources (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998) as well as 
strategic groups (e.g., Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, & Thomas, 1990; Lawless et al., 1989).
I complement this measure with the debt to asset ratio, defined as total liabilities divided 
by total assets (cf. Nath & Sudharshan, 1994). The debt to asset ratio is an important 
financial measure for understanding hospital funding (Nath & Sudharshan, 1994).
Performance. Organizational performance is a construct with innumerable 
indicators and definitions; a broad conception of the domain o f performance includes 
financial performance, as well as organizational effectiveness (Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1986). To provide a rigorous test of the influences o f organizational 
resources and strategic group characteristics on hospital performance, I incorporate 
indicators from each subset o f organizational performance. To measure financial 
performance, 1 follow other studies that have compared firm and contextual influences on 
firm performance and use return on assets (ROA)(e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mauri & 
Michaels, 1998; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). Average occupancy is used to 
operationalize effectiveness (cf. Nath, 1988; Nath & Sudharshan, 1994), and efficiency is 
captured by admissions per bed (Ketchen, Thomas, & McDaniel, 1996).
Strategic Group Measures and Clustering Procedure
The evolution of configuration analysis has produced two distinct approaches 
(Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993). The inductive approach focuses on empirically 
derived configurations appropriate for a given context. For example, many strategic 
group studies have clustered firms on a variety o f industry specific measures including 
manufacturing, marketing, financial, and industry characteristics. Because each industry
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is seen as unique, the inductive approach provides no theoretical reason to expect a 
specific number o f strategic groups in any given industry. In contrast, the deductive 
approach is a theory driven approach that specifies generic strategies that can be applied 
to a wide variety o f industry contexts (Ketchen et al., 1993). Because o f the overarching 
interest in comparing theoretical frameworks, I rely on a deductive approach for its 
superior generalizability.
While other deductive approaches have been used in the literature (e.g., Dess & 
Davis, 1984), the deductive approach used in this study relies on two theoretical 
perspectives at the heart o f organizational analysis — strategic choice (Child, 1972;
Miles & Snow, 1978) and organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The basic 
premise o f this approach is that a firm’s strategy varies on two independent competitive 
dimensions derived from these theories (Zammuto, 1988) (see Figure 2). The first 
dimension relates to a firm’s competitive advantage, expressed as the ability to exploit 
new opportunities. This may be accomplished by being first to market, or otherwise 
exploiting a new market quickly. The second dimension focuses on breadth of 
operations. This dimension includes number of distributors, geographic or product scope, 
and market growth/ share goals (Bantel, 1998). A strong competence in only one o f these 
dimensions is needed for sustained competitive advantage (Zammuto, 1988).
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Figure 2. Strategic types combining the organizational ecology and strategic choice 
perspectives. Adapted from Zammuto (1988).
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Combining these two dimensions results in four distinct quadrants that closely 
parallel the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. The first quadrant is represented by 
defenders/ K-specialists, who focus on existing opportunities in a narrow domain. The 
second quadrant encompasses entrepreneurs/ r-specialists, who pursue existing 
opportunities in a narrow domain. The third quadrant is comprised of Analyzers/ K- 
generalists, who efficiently exploit existing opportunities in a broad domain. Finally, 
prospectors/ r-generalists pursue new opportunities in a broad domain.
To implement this deductive approach, I used indicators from each of the two 
competitive dimensions: source of competitive advantage and breadth of operations (cf. 
Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993). Competitive advantage in the health care industry 
was measured as the average percentage of routine patient days for each hospital in the 
study from the years 1988-1990. This was calculated as the number o f total routine in­
patient days divided by the total number of in-patient days (cf. Ketchen, et al., 1993). 
Hospitals seeking to exploit new services will have a large percentage of their patients 
relying on nonroutine services such as neonatal and bum care units relative to the 
percentage relying on routine services (e.g., radiology, pharmacy) (Ketchen et al., 1993; 
Shortell et al., 1990). Hospitals attempting to gain competitive advantage through 
nonroutine services tend to emphasize innovation (an r-strategy), whereas those with a 
high percentage of routine service days focus more on efficiency (a K-strategy) (cf. 
Ketchen et al., 1993). Breadth of operations was operationalized as the average number 
of services offered by each hospital during 1988-1990. Hospitals that operate with a 
narrow breadth of service offerings follow more o f a specialist strategy, while hospitals 
with a broader range follow more o f a generalist strategy (Ketchen et al., 1993).
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A two-stage clustering procedure was used to cluster the firms in the analysis 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992; Ketchen & Shook, 1996). A two-stage process 
is valuable because it increases the validity of cluster solutions (Ketchen & Shook, 1996; 
Milligan, 1980; Punj & Stewart, 1983). This procedure first uses hierarchical clustering 
to determine the number o f groups and their cluster centroids (i.e., Ward’s method) and 
then uses the results as the starting point for a nonhierarchical clustering (i.e., K-means). 
Criterion validity was assessed through MANOVA significance tests with the 
performance variables used in this study (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). After deriving 
groups, the group means for each of the variables in the cluster analysis were used as 
level-2 variables in the hierarchical linear modeling analysis.
Analysis
To test the influences o f firm and strategic group levels of analysis I use a 
hierarchical linear modeling technique (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) allows for the treatment of multiple levels of analysis on a single 
dependent variable. HLM is uniquely suited to strategy research because many questions 
in strategic management research involve an inherently nested structure (i.e., firms are 
nested within strategic groups; strategic groups are nested within industries, etc.). 
Specifically, I used the HLM/2L statistical software program (Bryk et al., 1996) to 
measure organizational (i.e., level-1) and strategic group (i.e., level-2) effects on hospital 
performance. The technique estimates the amount of variance in organizational 
performance that is accounted for by each level o f analysis (i.e., hospital and strategic 
group), as well as tests independent variables that may explain variance in performance at
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each level (i.e., specific hospital resources and strategic group characteristics). Appendix 
A provides details o f  the HLM method and models tested in this study.
Results
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations among level-1 
(i.e., individual hospital) variables. The cluster analysis results indicate three distinct 
groups that are depicted visually in table 3. Group 1 consists o f defenders who rely on a 
limited number of routine services. Group 3 consists o f prospectors who use a high 
degree o f nonroutine services while operating in a large operations breadth. Group 2 
consists o f hospitals who balance both innovation as well as operations breadth. These 
firms do not clearly follow one o f the strategic types proposed by Zammuto (1988). I 
label these hospitals as “balancers" in the post hoc analysis that follows. Results o f 
MANOVA significance tests using firm performance measures support the validity of 
cluster solutions. The Wilks’ Lamda, provided by the MANOVA shows significant 
differences in performance based on group membership (F6.I62 = 10.44; pc.OOl).
The variance decomposition results for each of the performance measures used to 
evaluate hypothesis 1 are found in table 4. For financial performance, differences within 
strategic groups accounted for 98.2% o f the variance in ROA. In contrast, only 1.8% of 
the variation was accounted for by between group differences. This 1.8% of variance 
was insignificant (p = .11). For organizational effectiveness, 89.36% of the variation in 
average occupancy was accounted for by within group differences while 10.64% o f the 
variation was between groups. In terms o f efficiency, 59.83% o f the variation in
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Table 2. Correlations Among Level-1 Independent Variables (Hospital Data)
Mean Standard
deviation
I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Capital Spending 3.66 4.24 1.00
2. Urban/ Suburban .48 .50 .11 1.00
3. Direct Med. Exp. 19.54 22.79 .18 .24 1.00
4. Age 69.41 46.97 .34 .27 .18 1.00
5. Current Ratio 2.07 1.07 .07 -.04 -.02 .22 1.00
6. Debt-to-assets .67 .39 .00 .25 .03 -.07 -.59 1.00
Notes: n = 86; Correlations above .2 are significant at the .05 level; Correlations above .3 
are significant at the .01 level.
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Table 4. Variance Decomposition -  Hospital Data
ROA Occupancy Admissions/ Bed
Level - 1 (Hospital) 98.2% 89.36% 59.83%
Level -  2 (Group) 1.8% 10.64% 40.17%
Total 100% 100% 100%
admissions per bed was accounted for by within group differences and 40.17% o f the 
variation was between groups. For both nonfinancial measures, the amount o f variance at 
each level was significant (pc.OOl). Overall, these results paint a mixed picture. Group 
membership had no effect on financial performance, but a significant influence on 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency, providing mixed evidence for hypothesis 1.
Table 5 displays the results for hypothesis 2 that predicted an influence of 
strategic group characteristics on performance above and beyond that felt by
Table 5. Tests of Group (i.e., main) Effects Controlling for Organizational 
Resources (p-values)
ROA Occupancy Admissions per bed
Percentage o f routine patient days (yoi) 1 -40 .71 .89
Numbers of services (702) I -36 .34 .10
Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are grand mean centered
while group characteristics are uncentered.
(Coefficients)
ROA Occupancy Admissions per bed
Percentage of routine patient days (yoi) 87 2.89 -276.39
Numbers of services (702) 00 .01 - 1.00
Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are grand mean 
centered while group characteristics are uncentered.
organizational resources. The first step in this process involved testing organizational 
resources. These variables included physical resources (i.e., capital spending and urban/
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suburban location), intangible resources (i.e., organizational age and direct medical 
expenses), and financial resources (i.e., current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio).
Although HLM and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are equivalent in 
terms of a level-1 model, HLM does not provide for a straightforward method for 
calculating the percentage of variance explained comparable to an OLS R2. While some 
formulas for approximating the variance explained exist (cf. Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), 
estimates from these methods are problematic (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). Because 
significance is only found for level-1 variables, I report results from OLS regression 
analysis for their simplicity o f estimation and interpretation. These results are displayed 
in table 6. Overall, financial resources (i.e., current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio) 
significantly predicted financial performance (i.e., ROA). R2 estimates for ROA, 
occupancy, and admissions per bed were .26, .09, and .12 percent respectively.
Table 6. Regression Results for Organizational Resources
ROA Occupancy Admissions
_____________________________ per Bed
P t P t P t
Capital Spending .15 1.43 .05 .65 .22t 1.93
Urban/ Suburban -.08 -.71 .13 .27 -.20t -1.68
Hospital Age .06 .50 .01 .93 .06 .50
Direct Medical Expenses -.11 -1.06 .16 .15 .15 1.36
Current Ratio .29* 2.33 -.18 .18 .13 .99
Debt-to-Assets -.2 I t -1.70 -.27* .05 .09 .68
df (6,79) (6,79) (6,79)
R2 .26 .09 .12
F 4.69** 1.37 1.77
Notes: /i=86 tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.001
Step 2 in the evaluation o f hypothesis 2 utilizes HLM to explore the influence of 
strategic group characteristics after controlling for hospital characteristics. Results o f  this 
test indicate strategic group characteristics chosen for this study did not predict
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performance irrespective o f performance type (i.e., financial, effectiveness, efficiency). 
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 5. Hence, while step 1 indicated that 
organizational characteristics do influence performance, strategic group characteristics 
explored in step 2 held no additional explanatory power. Hypothesis 2, therefore, was 
not supported.
Hypothesis 3 argued that strategic group characteristics moderate the extent to 
which organizational level variables influence performance. The HLM results for this 
analysis are displayed in table 7. Because none of the cross-level interaction terms were 
significance, hypothesis 3 was not supported.
In sum, results o f hypothesis 1 detected variance in organizational performance 
both within and between strategic groups. Further, evidence used to test hypothesis 2 
suggests that resources are useful in explaining a considerable amount of that variance. 
This finding is especially strong for financial performance (i.e., ROA). This analysis 
complements the variance components results that found most o f the variance in financial 
performance exists at the organizational level. Group characteristics, however, explained 
no additional variance above organizational resources tested at the organizational level. 
Post Hoc Analysis (Strategic Groups and Performance)
To further understandings of the effects o f strategic group membership among 
hospitals, 1 conducted additional post hoc analysis to detect performance differences 
among strategic groups. Because o f the post hoc nature o f this test, the results cannot be 
viewed as definitive; however, this additional inquiry may be useful in identifying 
“possibilities” associated with group influences on performance. Also, results o f this test 
add to the body of research that seeks to understand the influence of group membership
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Table 7. Tests of Group (i.e., moderation) Effects on Organizational Resources 
(p-values)
ROA Occupancy Admissions 
per bed
Percentage of routine patient days
Capital Spending (yi 1) 1.00 1.38 1.39
Urban/ Suburban (721) 1.21 1.24 1.08
Hospital Age (731) 1.01 1.12 1.28
Direct Medical Expenses (741) .22 1.00 1.24
Current Ratio (751) .16 1.14 1.13
Debt-to-Assets (y6i) 1.06 1.07 1.29
Numbers of services
Capital Spending (712) 1.00 1.38 1.39
Urban/ Suburban (722) 1.27 1.38 1.08
Hospital Age (732) 1.01 1.04 1.39
Direct Medical Expenses (742) .31 1.00 1.39
Current Ratio (752) .18 1.27 1.27
Debt-to-Assets (762) 1.09 1.04 .80
Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are group mean centered, 
while group characteristics are uncentered.
(Coefficients)
ROA Occupancy Admissions 
per bed
Percentage of routine patient days
Capital Spending (711) .00 .00 -.00
Urban/ Suburban (721) -1.98 1.53 -88.87
Hospital Age (731) .00 .01 -2.13
Direct Medical Expenses (741) .00 -.00 .01
Current Ratio (751) -.01 -.68 87.89
Debt-to-Assets (y6i) -.02 1.04 664.85
Numbers of services
Capital Spending (712) .00 .00 .00
Urban/ Suburban (722) -.01 .01 -.46
Hospital Age (732) .00 .00 -.01
Direct Medical Expenses (742) .00 .00 .00
Current Ratio (752) -.01 -.00 .33
Debt-to-Assets (762) -.02 .01 3.00
Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are group mean centered, 
while group characteristics are uncentered.
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on organizational performance (Bantel, 1998; Cool & Schendel, 1987; Ketchen et al., 
1993; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989).
The MANOVA significance test used to validate cluster solutions detected 
differences in performance based on group membership. Financial performance (i.e., 
ROA), organizational effectiveness (i.e., occupancy), and organizational efficiency (i.e., 
admissions per bed) were all dependent variables in this analysis. This test was therefore 
followed up with univariate ANOVAs in this post hoc analysis to profile differences 
among performance measures. The results o f this analysis, as well as the means for each 
group along each performance measure are displayed in table 8. The univariate ANOVA 
tests were significant for nonfinancial performance measures. Specifically, “defenders” 
performed significantly better in terms of effectiveness (i.e., occupancy) while 
“prospectors” fared better in terms of efficiency (i.e., admissions per bed). In contrast, 
groups did not differ significantly for financial performance (i.e., ROA). This finding is 
consistent with results o f hypothesis 1 that detected little variation in financial 
performance that is attributed to the group level o f analysis.
Table 8. Post Hoc Strategic Groups Analysis (Means)
ROA Occupancy Admissions per Bed
Defenders .02 76.68 22.15
Balancers -.01 68.58 35.36
Prospectors .02 75.95 37.20




Managers face a delicate balance between positioning their organizations uniquely 
in their competitive environments while simultaneously maintaining awareness o f 
competitors whose actions are worthy of imitation. The thesis o f this paper has been that
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both of these factors -  a firm’s distinct uniqueness and how a firm is positioned within a 
group of similarly acting competitors -  are critical determinants o f organizational 
performance. In the following sections I elaborate on how both of these areas of 
managerial focus are important for explaining differences in organizational performance.
I then discuss limitations of this research and suggest directions for future inquiry. 
Multiple Performance Influences
For two of the three performance measures, the analysis revealed significant 
variation in both the organizational and group levels. Hence, it appears that both 
organizational uniqueness and group membership can be used to explain performance 
differences among organizations. This finding builds upon a growing body of work in 
the strategy literature that has focused on examining the degree to which firm or industry 
“drives” performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 
1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; 
Schmalensee, 1985). None o f these studies, however, have accessed the degree to which 
the strategic group level of analysis influences this variance. Based on the variance in 
performance found in this study, it seems that previous research has been underspecified 
and ignored an important dimension of performance influence. Thus, our understanding 
of the true nature of organizational performance has been limited. Perhaps this is one 
reason why this body of research continues to be plagued by equivocal findings.
For organizational effectiveness (i.e., occupancy), group differences accounted for 
roughly ten percent of this variance. For organizational efficiency (i.e., admissions per 
bed), group membership explained a considerable forty percent o f the performance 
differences. These findings support a small body o f research that suggests strategic group
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membership as well as organizational positioning can have an important bearing on 
organizational processes and outcomes, including performance (e.g., Reger & Huff, 
1993). As well, these results are consistent with others who found strategic groups 
influence performance when the strategic group definition is based on a deductively 
defined framework (Bantel, 1998; Dess & Davis, 1984; Ketchen et al., 1993). However, 
the finding that strategic group membership is relevant for explaining nonfinancial 
elements o f performance is in contrast to results by Nath and Sudharshan (1994). Using 
multiple indicators to measure financial decisions, production/ operations strategy, 
human resources, and business strategy they found no significant differences in 
occupancy across the inductively defined strategic groups in their healthcare sample.
Despite the general finding that variance in hospital performance exists at the 
group and organizational levels, not all the performance measures were supported. In 
particular, nearly all the variance in hospital financial performance (i.e., ROA) was 
attributed to the organizational level o f analysis. One explanation for this result is that 
because health care providers encompass organizations with both for-profit and not-for- 
profit orientations, profitability measures such as ROA may be less salient performance 
measures for some hospital managers (Kumar, Subramanian, & Yauger, 1998). Most o f 
the firms in this sample are in fact not-for-profit hospitals. Thus, the considerable 
variation in ROA may be dependent on “for-profit status” -  an organizational 
characteristic.
Lack of Group Main and Moderating Effects
Results failed to confirm hypotheses 2 and 3 that explored the role of strategic 
group characteristics on organizational performance. However, several possible
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explanations for these results seem plausible. First, the lack o f significant group main 
effects while controlling for firm resources might suggests that the characteristics used to 
define group membership are not the same group factors that explain organizational 
performance. The variables used to cluster organizations in this study were based on 
theoretical guidance from Zammuto’s (1988) typology derived from a synthesis of 
strategic choice and population ecology literatures. However, future research may 
benefit by exploring factors that are unique to each group, such as bargaining power over 
buyers and suppliers. Such factors may provide mobility barriers that enhance 
performance beyond organizational resources. Thus, future research should explore the 
role of strategic group variables other than those used to define group membership.
Results in this study did not support the hypothesis that group characteristics 
moderated the relationships between firm resources and performance. If group 
characteristics do not moderate the relationships between resources and performance, it 
seems that in this sample, resource value is better understood in terms of an 
organization’s unique positioning o f resources within the industry, irregardless o f 
differences from the group. Thus, future research might benefit from an examination of 
how industry characteristics may moderate the relationship between firm resources and 
performance.
The lack of significance for the group measures should by no means be 
interpreted as a lack o f  support for the importance o f group membership. Clearly, the 
variance components analysis as well as post hoc analysis suggests that some o f 
organizational performance is a function of groups. The typology used in this study, 
however, may warrant further scrutiny in this unique industry context. While Zammuto’s
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(1988) original classification scheme proposed four distinct types of firms, I detected 
evidence for only three groups in this industry. O f the three, only two clearly followed 
the strategies indicated by the juxtaposition of strategic choice and population ecology 
espoused by Zammuto (1988). While this finding casts doubt on the veracity o f certain 
specifics provided by the typology, results were nonetheless informative. Evidence from 
post hoc tests provided evidence that hospital performance may depend on consistent 
commitment to a clear strategy. Indeed, the hospitals that committed to either defender 
or prospector strategies outperformed the balancer group in this sample. This supports 
Zammuto’s (1988) more general assertion that to be successful organizations need to 
focus on innovation or efficiency, but not both.
Future research should continue to explore alternative definitions o f the strategic 
group construct. Perhaps researchers in strategic groups have been too specific in their 
approach to grouping firms. Indeed, much criticism has been levied against inductive 
approaches that focus on rich contextual understandings to the detriment of more 
generalizable insights (e.g., Ketchen et al., 1993). While the classification scheme used 
in this study sought to ameliorate this problem by simplifying the industry into four 
distinct groups, perhaps the typology did not go far enough in its simplification efforts.
A return to an ever more basic categorization such as innovation versus efficiency would 
serve to tie the strategic groups literature back to more traditional classification schemes 
such as Bums and Stalker’s (1961) typology o f mechanistic and organic systems. Future 
research should explore these as well as other classification schemes that may provide 
insights across multiple industry contexts.
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The Importance of Organizational Resources
To further understanding of resource-based influences on performance, Rouse and 
Daellenbach (1999) proposed a systematic process where researchers sample from a 
single industry, group firms based on a group typology, and profile performance 
differences within and between groups. This study draws from their suggestions to 
provide for a sophisticated test o f their procedure, and allow for rich understandings of 
the efficacy of firm resource holdings. Substantial variance in hospital performance was 
explained by testing organizational resource variables. More than 25% of the variance in 
financial performance (i.e., ROA) was explained by the organizational resources 
measured in this study. Thus, while group variables did not explain variance in hospital 
performance in the HLM results, the firm resource variables (i.e., current ratio and debt- 
to-assets) explained substantial performance variation using OLS regression. The RBV is 
often criticized because its tenets are a challenge to operationalize (Yeoh & Roth, 1999). 
This study is one o f a few empirical attempts to investigate the RBV. By doing so, it 
advances knowledge of resource holdings in an important industry context.
Our understanding of organizational performance may be aided by profiling the 
types o f resources that affected various performance measures. Financial resource 
measures were significant for financial performance (i.e., ROA). Specifically, hospitals 
with high liquidity (i.e. current ratio) and low debt-to-assets outperformed other hospitals. 
This finding has implications for researchers of organizational slack. The direct 
influence of slack resources on performance has been unclear in the literature (Cyert & 
March, 1963), with some arguing that slack allows for innovative actions that lead to 
performance (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986) while others asserting a negative
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relationship between slack resources and performance because slack is essentially 
“waste” (Antle & Fellingham, 1990). Results o f this study are consistent with those of 
Bromiley (1991) who found a positive relationship between slack and performance (as 
measured by current ratio and debt-to-equity). In the changing hospital environment 
investigated in this study, accruing slack resources seems critical to achieving superior 
financial performance.
Finally, results o f this study suggest that the effect o f resources is dependent on 
the type of performance being considered. Thus, managers must carefully monitor and 
accumulate resources needed to achieve their specific performance goals. For example, 
financial resources significantly predicted financial performance (i.e., ROA), but did not 
significantly effect nonfinancial measures (i.e., occupancy and admissions per bed). 
Empirical evidence supports the notion that the efficacy of certain resources may be 
context specific and vary across industry settings (Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). 
Empirical evidence from this study demonstrates a more puzzling relationship -  the value 
of certain resources also varies based on performance measure. This may be problematic 
for organizational functioning because mangers may become extremely efficient in 
achieving the wrong performance goals. Thus, an extention o f this research could focus 
on how the salience o f certain performance measures over others alters manager’s 
decisions to accumulate certain types of resources and how those decisions affect 
subsequent performance.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Several limitations specific to this study should be noted. First, the decision to 
control for industry limits the generalizability o f study results. Thus, future research
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should examine organizational, group, as well as industry influences on performance. A 
steady stream of research has examined firm and industry influences on firm 
performance, and to date has received equivocal results. By including the strategic group 
level of analysis, future research can develop a more realistic model of multiple firm 
performance influences.
Future research should also incorporate additional measures at the group level of 
analysis that may be critical for predicting variance in performance. I chose to rely on 
the variables used to define clusters as the measures that may explain organizational 
performance beyond organizational resources. Other group level variables, however, 
may be more useful towards explaining organizational performance. Researchers should 
encourage the discovery and use o f such measures. For example, measures o f mobility 
barriers or group bargaining ability might be included in future research efforts.
Conclusion
Understanding the determinants of organizational performance remains one of the 
central goals of the strategy field. Combining elements of the RBV and SGR suggests 
that both views aids in this endeavor. This study is the first to explore how much 
variance in organizational performance organizational and group levels o f analysis 
explain. One particular finding o f interest is that the amount o f variance at each level 
differs based on performance measure. Overall, findings from this study encourage 
researchers to look at multiple levels of analysis using multiple performance measures to 
provide a more comprehensive, albeit complex, understanding o f multiple influences on 
organizational performance.
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A MULTILEVEL EXAMINATION OF RESOURCE-BASED, STRATEGIC 
GROUP, AND INDUSTRY INFLUENCES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
Understanding the determinants of firm performance has been a central interest o f 
strategy researchers since the origin of the field in the 1960s (Rumelt et al., 1994). 
Strategy researchers have traditionally approached this research question in a more 
holistic approach than other disciplines — incorporating insights from psychology, 
economics, finance, marketing, and administrative management (Jemison, 1981a, 1981b; 
Rumelt et al., 1994; Summer et al., 1990). Indeed, one “distinctive competence” o f 
strategic management research is the blending o f multiple theoretical perspectives to aid 
in answering interesting and practical research questions such as the determinants o f firm 
performance (Meyer, 1991). The incorporation of multiple theoretical approaches can 
provide the basis for rich descriptions of organizational antecedents, actions, and 
outcomes (Combs & Ketchen, 1999).
Efforts to study the determinants of firm performance have generally focused on 
three influential levels of analysis: firm, industry, and strategic group (McGee & Thomas, 
1986). Researchers following the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Wemerfelt, 1984) argue that the heterogeneity o f firm resources is an important strategic 
factor that can differentially influence firm performance. Thus, performance differences 
emanate from firm resource differences. Strategic groups research has argued that firms 
following similar strategies may benefit from group characteristics that enable them to 
generate superior performance compared to others in the same industry (e.g., Dranove et 
al., 1998; Porter, 1979; Reger & Huff, 1993). Under this view, analysis o f  groups o f 
firms within the same industry can be beneficial. Drawing on considerable economic 
research (e.g., Bain, 19S6,1959; Mason, 1939), researchers in strategic management also
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agree that industry membership wields considerable influence on firm performance 
(Keats & Hitt, 1988; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1991).
When used in isolation, each of these views provides a partial explanation of why 
firms differ in terms o f performance. Within a given study, however, the exclusion of 
key influences leads to a host o f theoretical and empirical problems. Conceptually, 
overlooking one or more views detracts from our understanding of which level o f 
influence is more important in determining firm performance — an issue some have 
argued is at the very heart of the field (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Methodologically, studies 
focusing on only one level o f analysis limit the interpretability o f previous research. For 
example, if groups and industries influence performance, studies conducted at the 
individual firm level o f analysis have violated the independence o f observations 
assumption that underlies traditional statistical techniques (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; 
Hofmann, 1997). As well, if industry matters, studies focusing only on strategic group 
explanations are also subject to this criticism. One the other hand, studies that focus 
solely on higher levels, such as industries or strategic groups may be criticized because 
they overlook potentially meaningful lower level variance that exists among firms. A 
better understanding o f the “true” nature of firm performance could by gained if 
researchers heeded calls to incorporate multiple levels o f analysis (Henderson & 
Mitchell, 1997; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999).
I take the position that understanding the relative influences of multiple levels of 
analysis can be advanced by examining firm, strategic group, and industry influences on 
firm performance simultaneously. Such an analysis is needed to enhance our 
understanding of strategic group relationships in tandem with firm and industry effects
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(Cool & Schendel, 1988; Dranove et al., 1998; Mehra, 1996). As well, this approach 
provides a broader picture o f the multiple influences on firm performance. Examining 
multilevel influences on firm performance in a single model will shed light on two basic 
research questions. First, I will determine how much variance in firm performance is 
explained by each level o f analysis (i.e., firm, strategic group, industry), providing 
evidence for which level “matters” the most (cf. Rumelt, 1991). Second, I will test the 
extent to which key variables at each level o f analysis are responsible for explaining 
variance in firm performance. By taking this approach, I hope to provide insights 
concerning which level o f analysis is more important, as well as specifics about how and 
why variables at each level o f analysis influence performance.
Literature Review 
Multilevel Influences on Performance
The merits o f incorporating multiple levels o f analysis have been hailed by 
numerous scholars in the field of management in general (Hofmann, 1997; House, 
Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Klein, Tosi, & 
Cannella, 1999; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999) and strategy in particular (Dranove et al., 
1998; Henderson & Mitchell, 1997; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). Investigations about 
level o f analysis effects on firm performance represent an important exchange o f ideas in 
strategic management research. Indeed, a rich history in the strategy literature has tested 
the disparate influences o f firm and industry effects to determine which level o f analysis 
is more important for understanding firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush 
et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; 
Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985).
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While firm and industry characteristics represent two driving forces behind firm 
performance (Mauri & Michaels, 1998), some strategy researchers have argued that 
another level o f analysis — the strategic group — is also worthy o f investigation (Hunt, 
1972; Porter, 1979). Strategic groups are intraindustry groups o f firms making similar 
decisions in key areas (Porter, 1980; Reger & Huff, 1993). Numerous group traits such 
as shared identity (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997), strategy (Dess & Davis, 1984), bargaining 
power (Dranove et al., 1998) and mobility barriers (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Porter, 
1979) can influence managers’ interpretations and actions. Despite numerous studies that 
have found a relationship between group membership and performance (e.g., Dess & 
Davis, 1984; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996; Nath & Gruca, 1997; Reger & 
Huff, 1993), integration of the strategic group construct into investigations of firm and 
industry influences on performance has been scant (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rouse & 
Daelenbach, 1999). While a handful o f studies have acknowledged firm differences exist 
within strategic groups (e.g., Cool & Shendel, 1988; Lawless et al., 1989; Reger & Huff, 
1993), no study to date has simultaneously measured firm, strategic group, and industry 
influences on firm performance. Given that there is a wealth of conceptual evidence that 
firm differences as well as strategic group and industry membership play a role in 
determining firm performance differences (Dranove et al, 1998), I hypothesize the 
following,
Hypothesis 1: Firms, strategic groups, and industries explain unique components o f the 
variance in firm performance.
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Strategic Group Characteristics Influence Performance
While understanding the extent to which firms, strategic groups, and industries 
explain variation in firm performance can provide a valuable contribution to the 
literature, further insights can be gained by understanding how variables at each level of 
analysis influence performance. O f specific interest is the influence o f strategic group 
membership on performance. Strategic groups researchers have implicitly argued for a 
direct link between group membership and performance. Group membership in and of 
itself, however, is not directly responsible for differentiating groups in terms of 
performance. Instead, it is likely that persistent structural features such as mobility 
barriers in certain key areas make group membership more attractive in some groups over 
others (Caves & Porter, 1977; Dranove et al., 1998; Mehra, 1996). Other specific group 
traits might include group bargaining ability (Dranove et al., 1998), or a strong group 
reputation or image (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Thus, the advantage of group 
membership is a function of specific characteristics that define the group. These 
characteristics have been labeled as strategic industry factors, or resources that are 
valuable within an industry (as opposed to idiosyncratic resources) (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Mehra, 1996).
Our understanding of firm performance can be improved by testing strategic 
group characteristics that may influence performance. Traditionally, this has been 
accomplished by a two stage process where firms are first clustered into groups based on 
hypothesized characteristics and those groups are tested for performance differences. 
Some researchers, however, have criticized results o f  this strategy as being theoretically 
bankrupt (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990). Consequently, some have argued that future
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research in the strategic groups literature should offer a more rigorous test of the effects 
o f strategic group characteristics on firm performance that first controls for the effects o f 
firm resources (Dranove et al., 1998). The most straightforward test under this paradigm 
would measure the influence o f distinctively group characteristics while holding the 
influence of firm resources constant. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: Strategic group characteristics have a direct (i.e., main) effect on firm 
performance beyond that accounted for by firm resources.
Group membership may also have an indirect affect on firm performance by 
changing the nature of the relationship between firm resources and performance within a 
group. The idea that certain resources are more critical in some strategic groups than in 
others is consistent with Porter’s (1980) view that firm’s will be positioned within their 
strategic groups based on “structural” differences. While all firms within a strategic 
group may receive some benefit from group membership, resource heterogeneity may 
influence within group performance differences (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Indeed, Reger 
and Huff (1993) found that firms closely representing the group’s “core” defining traits 
outperformed firms following the group recipe less consistently. This notion is backed 
by considerable theoretical and empirical evidence stemming from the resource-based 
view that differences in firm resources and assets are critical determinants of firm 
performance differences (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Lawless etal., 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984).
Despite conceptual and empirical evidence that both firm resources as well as 
group characteristics influence firm performance, little guidance has been given about the 
form o f the relationship between resources, strategic group membership, and 
performance. I take the position that strategic group membership moderates the
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relationship between firm resources and performance. That is, characteristics of the 
group alter the efficacy of firm resources to enhance performance. For example, firms 
overcoming substantial mobility barriers in marketing and R&D to position themselves 
into a group will likely find it more difficult to differentiate their firms on these 
characteristics within the group. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 3: Strategic group characteristics moderate the relationship between firm 
resources and performance.
Industry Influences on Performance
Contextual differences stemming from industry effects have also played a key role 
in strategic management investigations of firm performance (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990; 
Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Industry characteristics can 
influence strategic perspectives (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998), actions (Slevin & Covin,
1997) and outcomes (Dess et al., 1990; Li & Simerly, 1998). Industry conditions may 
make certain types of strategic groups more likely to achieve superior performance. Most 
strategic groups researchers, however, have explicitly controlled for contextual industry 
influences by investigating groups through rich analysis o f a single industry setting (e.g., 
Houthoofd & Heene, 1997; Lewis & Thomas, 1990; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Mehra, 
1996).
While most empirical research on strategic groups has sidestepped the influence 
of industry characteristics on performance, Ketchen, Thomas, & Snow (1993) provided 
some general ideas about how industry conditions may favor one strategic group over 
another. Specifically, they argued that in environments characterized by low 
munificence, “specialist” groups focusing on narrow product offering will outperform 
“generalists” that operate in a broad domain. As well, they assert that in dynamic
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environments, firms focusing on capitalizing on new opportunities will outperform firms
who focus on exploiting existing opportunities. While they found some support for their
assertions, their use o f a single industry did not allow for examination of the effects of
variance in munificence and dynamism in a multi-industry setting. Thus, while evidence
has raised the possibility that industry characteristics may influence strategic group
membership on performance, a true moderated relation has not been tested empirically.
Because little theoretical guidance suggests how industry characteristics influence
strategic group performance, I propose the following hypothesis in its most general form,
Hypothesis 4: Industry characteristics moderate the influence o f strategic group 
characteristics on firm performance.
Method 
Sample
I drew my sample from the COMPUSTAT database. Compiled by Standard & 
Poor’s, COMPUSTAT includes accounting and financial data on over 7,000 companies 
in more than 300 industries. COMPUSTAT has been a well established database in 
strategic management because researchers gathering data from COMPUSTAT can be 
assured that data are comparable across companies and industries (Davis & Duhaime, 
1992; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). Because of the interest in examining multilevel 
influences on firm performance, I restrict my sample to firms that operate in a single 
business segment to eliminate statistical noise that would occur if  I attempted to measure 
diversified firms operating in multiple industries (cf. Mauri & Michaels, 1998). Also, the 
use o f nondiversified firms eliminates any confounding that would occur if  diversified 
firms were placed into strategic groups.
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A lagged structure was employed to improve the ability to make causal inferences 
about multilevel influences on firm performance (cf. Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Firm 
resources, strategic group traits, and industry characteristics were measured with data 
taken from the years 1991-1995, and firm performance variables were averaged from the 
years 1993-1997. The decision to use five years for firm resources, group traits, and 
industry characteristics was driven by the need to have data for the standard five-year 
time frame used to analyze industry characteristics (cf. Keats & Hitt, 1988; Weinzimmer 
et al., 1998) as well as to provide a stable basis for comparing competitive strategies (cf. 
Miles et al., 1993). Five years o f performance data are also necessary to provide a stable 
measure of firm performance (cf. Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
Three years of data overlap were chosen because some resources may have immediate 
effects on firm performance, while others may take a number of years before their 
performance affects are fully realized (cf. Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). The years 1991- 
1997 were selected because they were the most recent available from COMPUSTAT.
The sample was drawn from several manufacturing industries to enhance 
generalizabilty about firm, strategic group, and industry influences on firm performance. 
In addition to the single business requirement, the sample was further restricted to 
industries with a minimum of 45 firms to have the statistical power needed to detect a 
medium strategic group effect (Ferguson & Ketchen, 1999). This requirement also 
avoids biasing the sample to only find firm effects. Specifically, I sample from twelve 
four-digit SIC industries where competition is dominated by single business firms. 
Industries consisting primarily of undiversified firms tend to be less mature, younger, and 
relatively unconsolidated. The specific industries sampled include pharmaceutical
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preparations (SIC = 2834), in vitro/ vivo diagnostics (SIC = 2835), biological products 
(SIC = 2836), special industry machinery (SIC = 3559), computer communication 
equipment (SIC = 3576), computer periphery equipment (SIC = 3577), television and 
telegraph apparatus (SIC = 3661), radio, television broadcasting, and communication 
equipment (SIC = 3663), semiconductor related devices (SIC = 3674), surgical, medical 
equipment and apparatus (SIC = 3841), electromedical apparatus (SIC = 3845), and 
prepackaged software (SIC = 7372), bringing the total analysis sample to 1,163 firms. 
Firm Resource Measures
A number of firm resource categorizations have been presented in the literature 
(Black & Boal, 1994). I rely on the classification o f Chatteijee and Wemerfelt (1991), 
which places firm resources into three categories: physical, intangible, and financial.
This classification is well grounded in the literature (e.g., MacDonald, 1984; 
Montgommery & Hariharan, 1990; Teece, 1982) and remains a popular resource 
classification framework (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). To operationalize firm 
resources, I selected multiple measures from each o f these categories. As well, I selected 
measures with the requirement that they are useful in representing firm resources, yet are 
not idiosyncratic to any one industry (cf. Miles et al., 1993).
Physical resources. Physical resources encompass the firm’s physical 
technology, plant and equipment, geographic location, and access to raw materials 
(Barney, 1991). I use two indicators to measure physical resources. First, I use capital 
intensity, defined as capital expenditures divided by sales. A firm that makes a consistent 
commitment to capital expenditures is continually building their property, plant and 
equipment. As well, capital investment is a measure o f business strategy that has been
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shown to have a strong relationship with firm performance across studies (e.g., Capon, 
Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). To capture geographic location I 
use the percentage of domestic sales divided by total sales. A company with a high 
percentage of domestic sales is less likely to have global operations, and more likely to 
focus on domestic customers and suppliers o f raw materials.
Intangible resources. To conduct a thorough operationalization o f intangible 
resources, I include both purchasable and nonpurchasable intangible resources in my 
analysis. First, I use the number of patents granted to the firm between 1991 and 1995, 
available from the CASSIS database from the Patent and Trademark Office of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (Penner-Hahn, 1998). Because patent protection provides the 
owner with exclusive rights to make, use and sell the patented invention for more than a 
decade, a patent is an intangible resource that can be used by firms to achieve a sustained 
competitive advantage (Hall, 1992,1993).
While patents and other technology resources can be purchased in the open 
market, a company’s reputation is an intangible resource which can not be bought or sold, 
and usually has to be earned over a long period of time (Hall, 1992). A corporation’s 
reputation consists o f a set o f attributes inferred from the firm’s past actions and ascribed 
to the firm (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). To operationalize reputation I use ratings 
available from Standard & Poor’s (Fombrum, 1996). As one o f the top three ratings 
agencies, reputation measures derived from ratings agencies like Standard & Poor’s are 
appropriate forjudging general perceptions of company reputation, and are especially 
helpful for rating performance potential (Fombrum, 1996). Such ratings are based on a 
long-term perspective that extends beyond a brief earnings periods (Fombrum, 1996).
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Reputational measures from financial ratings agencies are appropriate forjudging 
reputation due to their access to information such as minutes of board meetings, profit 
breakdowns by product, and new product plans (Ederington & Goh, 1998; Ederington & 
Yawitz, 1987). While few ratings are available that are meaningful for multiple 
industries, Standard and Poor’s ratings available on COMPUSTAT provide a yearly 
average of multiple analyst’s projections concerning the firms potential earnings (i.e., 
earnings per share). I measure reputation as the average qualified opinion from 1991 to 
1995.
Financial resources. Liquidity ratios are commonly used to identify a firm’s 
availability of financial resources (Chatteijee & Wemerfelt, 1991; Palepu, 1986). 
Available financial resources provide the means for achieving strategic flexibility that 
can enhance organizational performance (Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). Following 
Chatteijee and Wemerfelt (1991), I use the current ratio to measure financial resources. 
The current ratio is calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities and 
represents a firm’s liquidity, or the ability to pay bills and other immediate debts. A 
second measure of financial resources used in this study is leverage. In particular, I 
measure the debt-to-equity ratio, which indicates the potential to generate financial 
resources in the future (Bromiley, 1991).
Performance
Firm performance is a concept with a substantial number o f possible indicators 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Hence, several distinct measures will be used here 
to operationalize the multifaceted nature of firm performance (i.e., accounting-based and 
market-based). First, I will use return on assets (ROA) because this measure has been
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used as an indicator o f performance in several multilevel studies o f firm performance 
(e.g., Brush et al., 1999; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Rumelt, 1991), 
and has often been the sole measure of firm performance in many o f these studies (e.g., 
Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991; 
Schmalensee, 1985). I supplement this accounting-based measure with return on 
investment (ROI), and return on equity (ROE). I measure market-based performance 
with the price-eamings ratio (PE)(cf. Lewis & Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996). Finally, 
Altman’s Z is a measure o f bankruptcy propensity, and is useful for understanding firm 
survival (Altman, Avery, Eisenbeis, & Sinkey, 1981).
Strategic Group Measures and Clustering Procedure
The evolution of configuration analysis has produced two distinct approaches 
(Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993). The inductive approach focuses on empirically 
derived configurations appropriate for a given context. In contrast, the deductive 
approach is a theory driven approach that can be applied to a wide variety of industry 
contexts (Ketchen et al., 1993). Because my interest is examining multiple strategic 
groups within a number o f industries, I rely on the deductive approach for its superior 
generalizability.
While other deductive approaches have been used in the literature (e.g., Dess & 
Davis, 1984), the deductive approach used here relies on two theoretical perspectives at 
the heart of organizational analysis — strategic choice (Child, 1972; Miles & Snow,
1978) and organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The basic premise o f this 
approach is that a firm’s strategy varies on two independent competitive dimensions 
derived from these theories (Zammuto, 1988). The first dimension relates to a firm’s 
competitive advantage, expressed at the ability to exploit new opportunities. This may be
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accomplished by being first to market, or otherwise exploiting a new market quickly.
The second dimension focuses on breadth of operations. This dimension includes 
number of distributors, geographic or product scope, and market growth/ share goals 
(Bantel, 1998). A strong competence in only one o f these dimensions is needed for 
sustained competitive advantage.
Combining these two dimensions results in four distinct quadrants that closely 
parallel the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. The first quadrant is represented by 
defenders/ K-specialists, who focus on existing opportunities in a narrow domain. The 
second quadrant encompasses entrepreneurs/ r-specialists, who pursue existing 
opportunities in a narrow domain. Analyzers/ K-generalists, efficiently exploit existing 
opportunities in a broad domain. Finally, prospectors/ r-generalists, pursue new 
opportunities in a broad domain.
I use two measures to cluster strategic groups along each o f the competitive 
dimensions developed by Zammuto (1988). To measure competitive advantage, I use 
R&D intensity (cf. Bantel, 1998). A firm that makes a significant, consistent investment 
to R&D has the capability to create an innovation or be an early follower (Schoenecker & 
Cooper, 1998). I measure R&D intensity as the average R&D expenditure divided by 
sales for the years 1991-1995 (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996). To measure breadth of 
operations, 1 use the number of trademarks the firm holds. Trademarks proxy for 
operations breadth because firms with a large number of trademarks are likely to be 
involved in the production o f numerous products, services, or devices (Cohen, 1986, 
1991; Hall, 1992). Conversely, firms that hold few trademarks are more likely to focus
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their operations on a narrow niche market. Thus, trademarks capture a number of 
unobservables associated with competitive scope.
A two-stage clustering procedure was used to cluster the firms in the analysis 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992; Ketchen & Shook, 1996). A two-stage process 
is valuable because it increases the validity of cluster solutions (Ketchen & Shook, 1996; 
Milligan, 1980; Punj & Stewart, 1983). This procedure first uses hierarchical clustering 
to determine the number o f groups and their cluster centroids (i.e., Ward’s method) and 
then uses the results as the starting point for a nonhierarchical clustering (i.e., K-means). 
Criterion validity was assessed through MANOVA significance tests with the 
performance variables used in this study (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). After deriving 
groups, the group means for each o f the variables in the cluster analysis were used as 
level-2 variables in the hierarchical linear modeling analysis, described later.
Industry Measures
Adequate measures for industry effects have been absent from much of the 
strategy literature (Dess et al., 1990). To provide a complete picture o f the industry level 
of analysis I followed two procedures. First, I stratified the sample by industry to ensure 
that samples coincide with the variables and relationships examined in the study 
(Harrigan, 1983). Second, I used the environmental dimensions o f munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity developed by Dess and Beard (1984). These measures 
provide continuous estimates of several environmental dimensions that a number of 
researchers in the field agree capture multiple environmental dimensions in a 
parsimonious fashion (Dess et al., 1990; Keats & Hitt, 1988). As well, these measures 
have been used in previous studies o f multilevel influences on firm performance (e.g.,
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Keats & Hitt, 1988; Lawless & Finch, 1989; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Sharfman & 
Dean, 1991; Weinzimmer et al., 1998).
Industry munificence, or environmental growth, was calculated by regressing five 
years of industry sales data over time. The corresponding standardized coefficient (i.e., 
P) was used as the measure of growth for each industry in the sample (cf. Boyd, 1995; 
Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Weinzimmer et al., 1998; Wiersema & Bantel, 
1993). Dynamism, or industry volatility, was operationalized as the standard error o f the 
regression coefficient for the munificence equation previously described (cf. Dess & 
Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988). The concept of environmental complexity has been 
described in many ways (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Porter, 1980), 
although complexity has most commonly been operationalized as industry concentration 
(e.g., Boyd, 1995; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Highly concentrated 
industries have few competitors, are fairly predictable and are low in complexity. In 
contrast, industries marked by low concentration have many competitors, with 
considerable activity that is difficult to monitor. Thus, I operationalize industry 
complexity as the five-year average of each industry’s four-firm concentration ratio (cf. 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Pennings, 1981; Romanelli, 1989).
Hieararchical Linear Modeling Analysis
To model the effects of multiple variables at each level o f analysis I use a three 
level hierarchical linear modeling technique to conduct the statistical analysis (cf. Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1988,1992; Duncan, Jones, & Moon, 1996; Raudenbush, Rowan, & 
Cheong, 1993; Raudenbush, Rowan, & Kang, 1991). Specifically, I use the HLM/3L 
software package (Bryk et al., 1996). The use of hierarchical linear modeling provides
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for improved estimation of fixed effects, while simultaneously allowing for the 
partitioning of variance-covariance components (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). While 
variance components models have been used in a number o f strategic management 
studies (e.g., Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Rumelt, 1991; 
Schmalensee, 1985), the HLM software package is advantageous because in addition to 
estimating the variance that resides at each level, these models also allow for the 
prediction of variance using multiple independent variables at each level of analysis 
(Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Thus, this methodology is able to assess how important 
each level is in explaining performance, as well as provide insights as to why each level is 
important. Although hierarchical linear modeling techniques have recently appeared in 
the management literature (e.g., Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Hofmann, 1997; 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Kidwell et al., 1997), these techniques have yet to be utilized 
in strategic management research. Details of the HLM method and its associated tests are 
provided in Appendix B.
Results
Table 9 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations among level-1 
(i.e., individual firm) variables. Table 10 reports the means, standard deviations and 
correlations among level-3 (i.e., industry) variables. Table 11 presents the descriptive 
statistics for dependent variables at the firm level o f analysis. Only two variables were 
measured at the group level o f analysis. The correlation of -.23 between these variables 
measured at level-2 (i.e., R&D Intensity and trademarks at the group level of analysis) 
was insignificant (p = .11).
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Table 9. Correlations Among Level-1 Independent Variables (COMPUSTAT Data)
Mean Standard
deviation
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Capital Intensity 1.77 6.79 1.00
2. % Foreign Sales 10.27 19.69 .01 1.00
3. Patents 2.56 5.89 -.04 .03 1.00
4. Reputation .27 .78 -.07 .21 .08 1.00
5. Current Ratio 3.84 3.15 .09 -.14 .13 -.28 1.00
6 . Debt-to-Equity 13.82 44.46 -.01 .04 .01 .11 -.07 1.00
Notes: n = 1,163 Correlations above .05 are significant at the .05 level. Correlations 
above .07 are significant at the .01 level




I . Munificence .91 .24 1.00
2. Dynamism 1.06 .05 -.04 1.00
3. Complexity .69 .18 -.27 .13 1.00
/!=  12
Table 11. Correlations Among Level-1 Dependent Variables (COMPUSTAT
Mean Standard
Deviation
I. 2 . 3. 4. 5.
l.R O A -16.14 31.77 1.00
2.ROI -18.54 51.25 .57 1.00
3. ROE -10.41 52.35 .39 .56 1.00
4. PE 4.59 22.61 .29 .19 .16 1.00
5. Altman’s Z 6.83 8.71 .15 .04 -.03 .01 1.00
Correlations above .1 are significant at the .01 level
Four strategic groups were detected in each industry. Results o f MANOVA 
significance tests using firm performance measures support the validity o f cluster 
solutions. The F tests from Wilks’ Lamda, provided by the MANOVA show highly 
significant differences in performance based on group membership for all industries in 
the sample (p<.001).
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The variance decomposition results for each of the performance measures used to
evaluate hypothesis 1 are found in table 12. For financial performance, ROA, ROI, and
ROE were measured. For ROA, 65.82% of the variance was accounted for by
differences within strategic groups, 14.95% o f the variance was between strategic groups,
and 19.23% of the variance was between industries. Using ROI, differences within
strategic groups accounted for 86.53% o f variance while differences among groups and
industries accounted for 3.4% and 10.07%, respectively. For ROE, 90.57% o f the
variance was accounted for by differences within strategic groups, .24% o f the variance
was between strategic groups, and 9.19% of the variance was between industries.
Table 12. Decomposition of Variance-COMPUSTAT Data (No Predictors 
Specified)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
Level -  1 (Firm) 65.82 86.53 90.57 95.74 96.08
Level -  2 (Group) 14.95 3.40 .24 1.85 2.59
Level -  3 (Industry) 19.23 10.07 9.19 2.41 1.33
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The other types of performance considered in this dissertation were market 
performance and survival. For market performance, 95.74 percent o f the variance in PE 
was within strategic groups, 1.85% o f the variance in firm performance was between 
groups, and 2.41% of the variance was between industries. Considering firm survival, 
96.08% o f the variance in Altman’s Z was within groups, while 2.59% of the variance in 
this measure was between groups and 1.33% of the variance was between industries. 
Overall, variance in firm performance was detected at each level o f firm performance 
(i.e., firm, strategic group, industry) across all performance measures. Even the .24% of
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variance in ROE at the group level of analysis was significant (p < .05), providing strong 
support for hypothesis I.
Hypothesis 2 argued that strategic group characteristics would influence firm 
performance above and beyond the influence o f firm resource variables. Results for the 
tests o f this hypothesis are presented in table 13. For ROA, both group R&D Intensity 
(i.e., source of competitive advantage) and trademarks (i.e., breadth of operations) 
significantly predicted performance above and beyond firm resources (t = -5.22, pc.OOl 
for R&D Intensity and t = 2.75, pc.Ol for trademarks). Group R&D Intensity (i.e., 
source of competitive advantage) was also a significant predictor of firm performance for 
ROI (t = -2.82, p<.0l) and ROE (t = -2.62, p<.05). In contrast, trademarks (i.e., breadth 
o f operations) did not significantly predict ROI (t = 1.38, p = .18) or ROE (t = .35, p = 
.73).
Table 13. Test of Group (i.e., main) Effects Controlling for Firm Resources 
(t-values)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
R&D Intensity (Poij) -5.22*** -2.82** -2.62* .05 -2.68**
Trademarks (Po2j) 2.75** .18 .73 .04 .79
*p<0.05 **p<0.0l ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are grand mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are 
uncentered
(Coefficients)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
R&D Intensity (potj) -1.34*** -1.18** -1.07* .01 -.17**
Trademarks (po2j) .99** .79 .18 .01 .07
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are grand mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are 
uncentered
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For firm survival, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage) 
significantly predicted Altman’s Z (t = -2.68, p<.01), while the influence of trademarks 
(i.e., breadth of operations) was not significant (t = .79,p = .43). For market performance 
(i.e., PE), however, group measures were not significant (t = .05, p = .96 for R&D 
Intensity and t = .04, p = .97 for trademarks). Overall, mixed evidence is found for 
hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 examined the degree to which group characteristics moderated 
resource influences on firm performance. Results for these tests are presented in table 14. 
Nine out of sixty (15%) possible moderator terms were significant. Considering financial 
performance, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) moderated the 
influence of intangible resources (i.e., patents and analysts’ ratings) on ROA (t = -2.02, 
p<.05 for patents and t =-3.41, p<.00l for analysts’ ratings) and approached significance 
for physical resources (i.e., percentage of foreign sales; t = 1.69, p<.l). Also, group 
trademarks (i.e., breadth of operations) moderated the effects of intangible resources (i.e., 
analysts’ ratings) influence on performance (t = -2.14, p<.05). For ROE, group R&D 
Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage) moderated the effects of financial 
resources on performance (t = 2.28, p<.05 for current ratio and t = -1.71, pc.l for debt-to- 
equity).
For market performance, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive 
advantage) moderated intangible resources (i.e., analysts’ ratings; t = -2.13, p<.05) 
influence on performance and group trademarks (i.e., breadth of operations) moderated 
physical resource (i.e., percentage of foreign sales) influence on the price-earnings ratio (t 
= -1.94, p<.05). For organizational survival, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of
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Table 14. Test of Group (i.e., moderation) Effects on Firm Resources
(t-values)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
R&D Intensity
Capital Intensity (Pi ij) -.44 -.17 .19 -.06 -2.52**
% Foreign Sales (p2ij) 1.69+ 1.24 .35 .09 .51
Patents (p3ij) -2 .02* -.99 -1.17 .20 1.37
Reputation (P4ij) -3.41*** -.90 .17 -2.13* 1.58
Current Ratio (Psij) .17 .69 2.28* -.84 - 1.02
Debt-to-equity (p6ij) 1.00 -.08 -1.73+ 1.12 -.71
Trademarks
Capital Intensity (Pi2j) -.34 -.31 -.11 .19 .64
% Foreign Sales (p22j) .96 1.14 .29 -1.94* 1.39
Patents (p32j) -.49 .01 .49 .69 -.94
Reputation (P42j) -2.14* -.96 .07 .88 .60
Current Ratio (Ps2j) -1.17 -.37 -.47 -1.02 -.12
Debt-to-equity (p62j) -.99 -.08 -.55 .59 -1.39
tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.0l ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are group mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are 
uncentered
(Coefficients)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
R&D Intensity
Capital Intensity (Pi ij) -.01 -.01 .01 -.00 -.02**
% Foreign Sales (p 2ij) .07+ .10 .03 .00 .01
Patents (P3ij) -.12* -.11 -.13 .01 .02
Reputation (p4ij) -1.39*** -.69 .13 -.71* .19
Current Ratio (Psij) .01 .07 .23* -.04 -.02
Debt-to-equity (p 6ij) .01 -.00 -.03+ .01 -.00
Trademarks
Capital Intensity (p [2j) -.03 -.06 -.02 .02 .02
% Foreign Sales (p22j) .01 .03 .01 -.02* .01
Patents (P32j) -.03 .00 .05 .03 -.01
Reputation (P42j) -.84* -.71 .05 .29 .07
Current Ratio (p 52j) -.14 -.08 -.10 -.09 -.00
Debt-to-equity (P62j) -.01 -.00 -.01 .00 -.00
tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are group mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are 
uncentered
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competitive advantage) moderated the influence of physical resources (i.e., capital 
intensity) on Altman’s Z (t = -2.52, p<.01). Overall, several moderated relationships 
were found significant across performance measures. Thus, mixed evidence is found for 
hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 tested the degree to which industry characteristics moderated the 
effects o f group characteristics on firm performance. Results for this analysis are 
presented in table 15. For financial performance (i.e., ROA), both dynamism and 
complexity moderated the influence o f group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive 
advantage) on performance (t = -2.69, p<.05 for dynamism and t = 2.26, p<.05 for 
complexity) and there is some indication that munificence moderated the relation 
between group R&D Intensity and performance (t = -1.75, p<.l).
For market performance (i.e., PE), environmental munificence moderated group 
R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) on performance (t = -2.89, p<.01). 
Considering firm survival (i.e., Altman’s Z), all environmental dimensions (i.e., 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity) approached or reached significance for the 
effect o f group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage on performance; t = 
-1.86, p<.l for munificence; t = -1.71, p<.l for dynamism; t = 1.99, p<.05 for 
complexity). In sum, several moderated relationships for each type of performance (i.e., 
financial, market, and organizational survival) were significant (7 out of 30 possible; 
23.3%), providing mixed evidence in support of hypothesis 4.
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Table 15. Test of Industry (i.e., moderation) Effects on Group Characteristics
(t-values)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
Munificence
R&D Intensity (you) -.23 .27 -1.42 -.61 - 1.86+
Trademarks (7021) -1.75+ -.79 -.69 -2.89** -.25
Dynamism
R&D Intensity (yoi2> -2.69* -.40 -.36 -.49 -1.71 +
Trademarks (yo22) -.12 .27 .54 -.18 -.71
Complexity
R&D Intensity (you) 2.26* -.04 -.57 .28 1.99*
Trademarks (yo23) -.06 -.16 .97 .06 .28
+p<0.l *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: strategic group characteristics are group mean centered, while industry 
characteristics are uncentercd
(Coefficients)
ROA ROI ROE PE Altman’s Z
Munificence
R&D Intensity (you) -.77 1.53 -7.79 -1.49 -1.77+
Trademarks (yo2i) -2.26+ -1.77 -1.52 -2.84** -.09
Dynamism
R&D Intensity (yoi2) -256.22* -63.83 -53.65 -33.08 -44.71 +
Trademarks (yo22) -1.26 4.84 9.39 -1.39 -2.12
Complexity
R&D Intensity (you) 15.00* -.49 -5.83 1.28 3.58*
Trademarks (yo23) -.12 -.53 2.74 .08 .14
tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: strategic group characteristics are group mean centered, while industry 
characteristics are uncentered
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Discussion
Considerable effort in strategic management research has focused on 
understanding the influence o f two levels o f analysis -  firms and industries -  on firm 
performance. Results o f this study suggest that understanding group phenomena is also 
critical for both empirical study as well as managerial attention. In the following sections 
I discuss the role played by multiple levels o f influence on firm performance.
Multiple Performance Influences
Understanding the influences of firm performance is at the heart of strategic 
management (Keats & Hitt, 1988). A complete understanding requires integration of 
both resource-based and industrial organizational economic approaches to organizations 
(Collis, 1991). Accordingly, this study provides a comprehensive exploration of this 
approach by testing firm, strategic group, and industry influences on firm performance. 
The addition of the group level of analysis builds on considerable research investigating 
firm and industry influences on firm performance (e.g., Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush 
et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996;
Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). Two main findings emerge 
from the variance decomposition tests. First, significant variance exists at each level of 
analysis. Second, the amount o f variance explained in firm performance is partially a 
function of how performance is conceptualized and defined. Next, I discuss these 
findings for each level o f analysis (i.e., firms, strategic groups, and industries).
Overall, results indicate that managers’ actions to uniquely position their firms in 
the market is a more powerful influence on firm performance than strategic group or 
industry effects. Relative to previous research, the results o f this study found a much
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stronger firm effect and therefore supports others who find the majority of variance in 
firm performance can be attributed to unique firm effects (e.g., Mauri & Michaels, 1998). 
However, these results are at odds with others who have detected marginal firm effects. 
For example, the 65% of the variation in financial performance (i.e., ROA) found here is 
considerably larger than Schmalensee’s (1985) negligible corporate effect, Wemerfelt 
and Montgomery’s (1988) 2.6% variance explained by firm diversification, and 
somewhat larger than Rumelt’s (1991) 46% variation at the business level.
Several factors may account for the considerably larger amount of variance in 
performance at the firm level of analysis found in this study. One interpretation for this 
finding is that the use o f the lagged time structure played a key role. The importance of 
time has been demonstrated by Rumelt (1991), who replicated an earlier work by 
Schmalensee (1985) using the same sample but multiple years of data and detected a 
considerably larger firm business effect (46% of the variation as compared to a negligible 
effect for Schmalensee). Another reason may be the decision to only sample single 
business firms. For example, McGahan and Porter (1997) did not include single business 
firms in their sample and found 31.71% o f the variance was due to business segment 
effects while Mauri and Michaels (1998) relied exclusively on nondiversified firms and 
found as much as 36.9% of the variation was due to firm effects.
The HLM method used in this study also influenced study outcomes for multiple 
reasons. The variance components methods used by others used a series of nested 
ANOVA techniques to estimate multiple influences on firm performance. This 
estimation strategy has several undesirable limitations. For example, McGahan and 
Porter (1997) note that by not simultaneously estimating multiple effects, this
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computational disadvantage introduces considerable “noise” into study findings. This 
has been demonstrated by findings that “error” makes up between 8.7% and 68 .8% of the 
variance in performance (cf. Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 
1991). By simultaneous estimation, the HLM method uses the variation in performance 
found at each level o f analysis to partition variance (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Thus, 
no "error” variance remains after the variance components are estimated (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992). The use o f such methods results in considerable parsimony in 
estimation procedures as compared to other studies testing similar relationships in the 
strategy literature. For example, Rumelt’s fixed-effects ANOVA analysis necessitated 
the use of over 10,000 degrees o f freedom while McGahan and Porter (1997) required 
over 50,000 degrees o f freedom for their tests. In contrast, the HLM procedure used to 
test variance decomposition in this study required only 36 degrees of freedom. While the 
computation advantages o f iterative HLM techniques are well-documented (Du Toit, 
1995; Goldstein, 1986; Longford, 1987), this is the first study in the strategy literature to 
take advantage of such advancements.
The amount of variation in firm performance at each level o f analysis varied 
markedly based on how performance was conceptualized (i.e., financial, market, 
survival) as well as operationalized. Among financial indicators o f performance, 65.82% 
of the variation in ROA was at the firm level, compared to 86.53% for ROI and 90.57% 
for ROE. For both market performance (i.e., price-eamings ratio) and survival (i.e., 
Altman’s Z), even more o f the variation was attributable to the firm level o f  analysis. For 
market performance, 95.74% of the variation in PE was at the firm level. Similarly, 
96.08% of Altman’s Z (i.e., organizational survival) resides at the firm level. Findings
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from these measures provide even stronger support for the idea that unique firm 
differences are the most critical driver o f firm performance.
Conceptual as well as empirical explanations exist for why market performance 
and organizational were survival largely driven by firm, as opposed to group or industry 
phenomena. Market performance in this study was operationalized as the price-eamings 
ratio. Empirically, there is considerable variability in this measure within industries 
because a modest edge in earnings growth can results in a substantially higher multiple 
increase (Fridson, 1995). Conceptually, firm level decisions such as erratic changes in 
strategy also influence this measure substantially (Fridson, 1995). Similarly, 
organizational survival via bankruptcy is also subject to considerable discretion of 
individual firms. Once viewed as a sign of managerial failure, bankruptcy is becoming 
more accepted as a shrewd strategy for turnaround as 1978 legislation allows even 
solvent firms to take advantage of this legal maneuver (Tavakolian, 1995).
Although the majority of the variance in firm performance was attributable to the 
firm level of analysis, the influence of strategic groups was in several cases, considerable. 
Specifically, this study found that the addition of the strategic group level of analysis 
accounted for roughly 15% o f the variance in the most commonly operationalized 
measure of firm performance -  ROA. This component is comparable to the amount of 
variance many studies have found for the industry influence on performance (e.g., Mauri 
& Michaels, 1998; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Wemerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988) and more than what others found for firm effects (e.g., Schmalensee, 1985). This 
finding is also larger than the 8% of variance in firm performance found by Ketchen and 
colleagues (1997) meta-analytic review o f the influence o f organizational configurations
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and performance. While some researchers have argued that firm, group, and industry 
context are all important for understanding firm performance, this is the first study to 
simultaneously test each of these components. The results from the variance 
decomposition suggest that previous researchers may have underspecified their models 
when conducting tests o f the organization-environment interface, limiting our “true” 
understanding of firm performance.
Industry also consistently explained a significant component in the variance in 
firm performance. As with the firm and group effects, the amount of variance explained 
was a function o f how performance was conceptualized. While industry effects 
accounted for between 10 and 20% of the variance in financial performance (i.e., ROA, 
ROI, ROE), a much smaller influence was found for other types of performance. 
Specifically, only 2.41% of the variance in market performance (i.e., price-eamings ratio) 
and 1.33% of the variance in organizational survival (i.e., Altman’s Z) was at the industry 
level o f analysis. This suggests that while the industry level of analysis is considerable 
for financial performance, its influence on market performance and survival is less 
impressive. Thus, the conclusion that industry effects are the primary influence on firm 
performance found by many studies may be overstated.
A substantially larger amount of variation in firm performance was found when 
performance was operationalized by measures beyond ROA. Indeed, at least 20% more 
variation was estimated at the firm level using other performance measures. The call for 
multiple measures o f firm performance is not new to the field. Indeed, more than a 
decade ago Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) specifically called for 
operationalizations o f firm performance beyond accounting based measures.
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Despite the plea to move beyond accounting based performance measures, most 
studies o f firm and industry influences on performance continue to rely solely on ROA as 
the dependent measure of performance (e.g., Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; 
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). 
Findings from this study provide empirical evidence that this practice should be 
abandoned as it obscures differences that may be understood by profiling other salient 
performance types and measures. For example, more than twice the variance in both 
group and industry levels is found for ROA compared to other performance measures. 
This may be driven by the influence of assets -  a generally accepted measure of firm size 
(cfi, Weinzimmer et al., 1998). The influence o f size has been demonstrated to be a 
strategic group mobility barrier that influences firm performance (Lewis & Thomas,
1990; Porter, 1979). As well, size has also been argued to be an industry entry barrier 
that influences firm performance (cf. Porter, 1980). In sum, results o f this study support 
the notion that the complexity o f organizational performance can only be understood 
through rich conceptualizations of the performance construct beyond financial returns 
such as ROA (Hubbard & Bromiley, 1995).
Group Main Effects
Results of the variance decomposition just discussed point to the important, yet 
often overlooked role played by the strategic group level o f analysis in explaining 
variation in firm performance. These results focused on the extent of the level’s 
influence but not on how the strategic group level impacts performance. This dissertation 
also examined the nature o f strategic group influences on performance by identifying
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group characteristics believed to predict variance in firm performance above and beyond 
the effects o f firm resources.
Across financial performance (i.e., ROA, ROI, ROE) and organizational survival 
(i.e., Altman’s Z), there was a significant negative relationship between group R&D 
Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) and firm performance above and beyond 
any effect detected for firm resources. This suggests that irrespective of industry types, 
strategic groups that are characterized by efficiency (i.e., K-strategists) outperform other 
groups. For financial performance (i.e., ROA), there was also a significant positive effect 
for group trademarks (i.e., breadth o f operations). In tandem with the negative significant 
effect for group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage) found for ROA, 
even more specific findings can be presented for this performance measure. That is, 
controlling for firm resource effects, the most high performing firms in terms o f ROA 
focus on high domain breadth (i.e., trademarks) while maximizing efficiency (i.e., low 
source of competitive advantage as measured by group R&D Intensity). In terms o f the 
Zammuto (1988) framework, these firms would be labeled as analyzers.
Overall, these findings provide a rigorous test of strategic group influences while 
controlling for resource-based explanations. By doing so, this study overcomes common 
criticisms of strategic groups research. The groups, defined by theoretical rationale, 
clearly differed in terms of performance. Also, results o f this test answer the call o f those 
who have explicitly advocated the analysis o f group influences after controlling for 
resource-based explanations (Dranove et al., 1998). Hence, these significant findings 
may be used to improve our understanding o f group influences on performance.
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Group Moderation Effects
Results of the strategic groups analysis also suggest that group characteristics 
moderate the relationship between resource holdings and performance. Hence, this 
research builds on the work o f others (e.g., Reger & Huff, 1993) who have argued that 
positioning within a strategic group is an important aspect o f organizational strategy and 
firm performance. Specifically, results from this study suggest that the strength o f the 
relation between firm resources and performance is often dependent on characteristics of 
the strategic group.
Several significant cases existed where strategic group characteristics moderated 
the effects o f firm resources on firm performance. For example, in groups with high 
levels of R&D Intensity (i.e., innovation focus), the relationship between intangible 
resources and performance (i.e., ROA) was weaker than in groups with low levels of 
R&D Intensity (i.e., efficiency focus). A similar result was obtained for market 
performance. Also for market performance, managing physical resources (i.e., 
percentage of foreign sales) was more important for groups with fewer trademarks (i.e., 
niche groups) than groups with many trademarks (i.e., large operations breadth). Finally, 
for organizational survival, managing physical resources (i.e., capital intensity) is more 
important for firms with low group R&D Intensity (i.e., efficiency focus) than those with 
high group R&D Intensity (i.e., innovation focus). Overall, 9 o f the 60 possible 
moderated relationships (15%) were significant.
The existence of such moderated relationships suggests that attaining superior 
performance is a complex process that involves understanding resource-based advantages 
that might accrue in the context of the specific group strategy that a firm is pursuing.
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Consequently, managers must not only be aware o f critical resources that may influence 
firm performance in their industry, but also how the efficacy o f those resources may be 
enhanced or diminished by strategic group membership. This suggests that 
understanding performance vis-a-vis the resource-based view of the firm can not be 
accomplished by examining a firm’s idiosyncratic resources alone. In contrast, managers 
need to be keenly aware of groups operating in their industry, and how those groups 
might change the effectiveness of certain resources. Only then, can managers uniquely 
position themselves in their competitive environments.
Industry Moderation Effects
The idea that environmental context influences organizational performance has 
been long accepted in the field. Many researchers have discussed the considerable role 
that environments play in affecting firm performance (e.g., Bain, 1956; Porter, 1981). 
More specifically, researchers have argued that key industry characteristics such as 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity be examined in strategy studies (Dess et al., 
1990). Typically, studies have modeled the effects of industry as a direct influence on 
firm performance. This study adds to understanding of firm performance by testing the 
influence of industry characteristics on relations between strategic group membership and 
performance. Results o f  these tests shed light on how environmental context changes the 
influence of strategic group membership on performance.
A negative moderated relationship was detected between environmental 
dynamism and the efficacy o f group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive 
advantage) on financial performance (i.e., ROA). In dynamic environments, the 
relationship between efficiency focus (i.e., low group R&D Intensity) and performance is
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weaker than in stable environments. Coupled with results from hypothesis 2 (firms in 
groups focusing on efficiency outperform firms in groups focusing on innovation) these 
results provide evidence for Bums and Stalker’s (1961) structural contingency assertion 
that success o f organizational types is a function o f environmental conditions. Indeed, 
their “mechanistic” organizations who focus on task specialization and technical 
improvements are much akin to “K-specialist” firms in terms o f Zammuto’s (1988) 
categories based on strategic choice and population ecology literatures. As well, Bums 
and Stalker’s “organic” organizational forms that constantly tackle fresh problems with 
unforeseen requirements are similar to population ecologists “r-specialists” who 
continually search for the new opportunities in their competitive environments. Given 
the strong tie between the findings of this study and theoretical basis found in the 
population ecology literature, perhaps it is not surprising that this finding also approached 
significance for organizational survival (i.e., Altman’s Z).
For market performance (i.e., price-eamings ratio), there was a significant 
negative moderated relationship between environmental munificence and group 
trademarks (i.e., breadth of operations breath). Thus, as munificence increases the 
relationship between group operations breadth and performance weakens. This 
relationship also approached significance for financial performance (i.e., ROA). Results 
from hypothesis 2 detected a significant main effect between group trademarks (i.e., 
breadth o f operations) and performance in terms of ROA. The significant negative 
moderated effect o f munificence suggests that this relationship weakens when there is 
less environmental resource abundance (i.e., munificence is low). These results provide 
empirical support for Ketchen and colleagues (1993) who speculated that low
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munificence would favor specialist groups (i.e., entrepreneurs and defenders) over 
generalist groups (i.e., prospectors and analyzers).
Finally, a positive moderated relationship was detected between environmental 
complexity and group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage) for both 
financial performance (i.e., ROA) and organizational survival (i.e., Altman’s Z). Thus, 
while significant main effects found in tests o f hypothesis 2 suggested that K-specialists 
(i.e., defenders and analyzers) tended to outperform r-specialists (i.e., entrepreneurs and 
prospectors), this relationship becomes even stronger as complexity decreases (i.e., 
industry concentration increases).
Summary and Conclusion
This study builds on others who argue that competitive advantage results from a 
series o f connected decisions based on complex relationships between factors found at 
multiple levels o f analysis (e.g., Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). A conventional 
interpretation o f the results o f the variance components analysis might conclude that 
because most o f the variation exists at the firm level, that firm uniqueness is the critical 
area that “drives” firm performance differences. Such an interpretation tells only a 
portion o f the story. Attaining superior performance is a complex process that requires 
an intimate understanding of industry environments, similarly acting competitors, and a 
firm’s uniqueness. Given this premise, the driving characteristic o f firm performance is 
positioning within both group and industry. Here, firm uniqueness is certainly key, but 
only when managers have a keen understanding of their industry environments and 
strategic group processes present in those environments.
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This study’s inclusion o f multiple measures allows for rich comparison across 
indicators o f performance, and may serve to challenge previous study findings. For 
example, results of this study found that the firm level o f analysis explained most o f the 
variation in firm performance across performance measures. As well, a significant 
amount o f variation in performance was detected at the firm, group, and industry levels 
across performance measures. The amount of variation, however, varied considerably 
among levels and performance measures. Most notably, when industry effects were 
measured in terms of nonfinancial measures, their influence was considerably less than 
results found by previous researchers. While calls for the use o f such performance 
measures are not new to the strategy field (cf., Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986), 
response to such calls has been slow. Future research could extend findings from this 
study by looking at other nonconventional performance measures. For example, 
economic value added has recently emerged as one of the more salient performance 
measures used to assess organizational performance by top executives (Bontis, 
Dragonetti, Jacobsen, & Roos, 1999). As well, corporate social performance is also a 
salient measure for many firms (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Ruf, Muralidhar, & 
Paul, 1998; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The inclusion o f such performance measures 
may provide additional insights in future inquiries.
In Rumelt’s (1991) often-cited study of firm and industry influences on firm 
performance he asks the question, “how much does industry matter?” This study builds 
upon considerable research into influences on firm performance by asking, “how much 
do strategic groups matter?” The answer to this question may largely be in the eye o f the 
beholder. On the one hand, group characteristics explained variation in firm performance
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above and beyond firm resources and moderated the efficacy of other resource holdings. 
Despite this influence, most o f the variation was at the firm, not industry or group, level 
o f analysis. Overall, results suggest that firms’ unique positioning both within their 
groups as well as industries is the most critical aspect that “drives” firm performance.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation incorporates insights from the resource-based view, strategic 
groups research, and industrial organizational economics to improve understanding o f the 
determinants o f organizational performance. Conceptual foundations suggested that 
understanding each view is necessary to fully comprehend the determinants of 
organizational performance. Results from both empirical studies validate this argument. 
In both the hospital sample, as well as the multi-industry sample, variation in 
organizational performance was detected at both the organizational and group levels o f 
analysis. While both resource-based and strategic group explanations enhance 
understandings o f organizational performance, this dissertation supports the notion that 
firm uniqueness is the key driver of performance. That is, how managers uniquely 
position their organization within their industry, as well as within a group of similarly 
acting competitors, is the critical determinant o f organizational functioning.
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APPENDIX A: HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING
PROCEDURE FOR HOSPITAL DATA
The Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) methodology used in this study 
involves a two-level approach (cf. Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). The first level examines 
relationships among variables within strategic groups that generate intercept and slope 
parameters linking the within-group independent variables (i.e., hospital resources) to the 
outcome measure for each group (i.e., hospital performance). This model is analogous to 
the familiar linear regression, although the Bayes algorithm used to estimate the level-1 
components is noted for its superior precision and reliability (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; 
Morris, 1983). The HLM algorithm is able to provide better estimates of the predictors 
o f hospital outcomes within strategic groups by “borrowing” information about these 
relationships from other groups and hospitals (cf. Bryk, Raudenbush, & Congdon, 1996). 
fn the level-2 model, the intercept and slope parameters are used as outcome variables 
and regressed on between-groups variables.
When estimated without predictor variables, the level-2 model is essentially a 
one-way analysis o f variance (Hofmann, 1997). The HLM ANOVA model was used to 
test hypothesis I that investigates the amount of performance explained by organizational 
and group levels. This is accomplished by partitioning variance into within (i.e., 
hospital) and between (i.e., strategic group effect) group components (cf. Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). The following set of equations will be estimated to 
conduct the variance partitioning in HLM:
Level-1: Performance,y = |3oy + Hj
Level-2: p0y = Yoo + U oj
Where Performance^ is the performance measure of a single dependent variable (e.g., 
ROA) for hospital / in group j .  p0y is the mean performance for group J, and y00 is the 
grand mean performance (i.e., the mean of group means). In this set of equations, the 
level- 1 equation includes no predictors and, therefore, the regression equation only 
includes an intercept estimate. The level-2 model regresses each strategic group’s mean 
performance onto a constant; that is, Poy is regressed onto a unit vector resulting in a yoo 
parameter equal to the grand mean performance (i.e., the mean of group means, Poy). The 
level-1 residual (i.e., r,y) represents within group variance in performance. The level-2 
residual (i.e., Uoj) represents any between group variance in performance. By calculating 
a ratio o f the between group variance divided by the total variance in performance, HLM 
provides information on the percentage of the total variance in performance residing both 
within and between strategic groups (cf. Hofmann, 1997).
In addition to the ability to estimate variance components at multiple levels o f 
analysis (i.e., hypothesis 1), HLM is also able to test the effects o f multiple independent 
variables at each level. This feature is used to test hypothesis 2, which argues that 
strategic group characteristics have a direct affect on firm performance (above and 
beyond hospital resources). This was tested by adding strategic group level measures 
(i.e., group operations breadth and source of competitive advantage; y0i and 702) at level-2
125
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to predict group performance (Poy). This can be specified with the following set o f 
equations:
Level-1: Performance,y = Poy + Piy (Capital Spending//) + P2y (Urban/Suburban//) + P3y 
(Direct Medical Expenses//) + p4y(Ageij) + Psy (Current Ratio//) + p6y(Debt-to-total- 
assets ij) + r,y
Level-2: poy = yoo + Yoi (Percent routine patient days/) + 702 (Number of services/) + Uoj
HLM provides a /-test for each level-2 parameter. This tests if each of the strategic group 
characteristics (i.e., yoi and 702) has a significant main effect on performance 
{Performance! j). If so, then firm performance can be explained by group characteristics.
It is worth noting that when using HLM, variable “centering” affects substantive 
conclusions that can be drawn from empirical tests (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Kreft, De 
Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995). To control for level-1 variables, they are first “centered” around 
their grand means (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). For example, when testing hypothesis 3, 
the level-1 variable that measures capital expenditures (e.g., Piy Capital Spending//) is 
modeled by subtracting the grand mean capital spending from the individual hospital’s 
spending so that the ievel-l variable is now modeled as p iy (Capital Spending// -  Capital 
Spending ..) where Capital Spending.. represents the grand mean capital spending. Other 
independent variables are modeled in the same manner.
Hypotheses 3 argues that strategic group characteristics moderate relationships 
between firm resources and performance. This was tested by adding strategic group level 
measures at level-2 to predict significant independent variables at level-1. This is 
illustrated with the following set of equations:
Level-1: Performance,y = poy + Piy (Capital Spending//) + P2y (Urban/Suburban//) + P37 
(Direct Medical Expenses//) + p4y (Age//) + Psy (Current Ratio//) + p6y(Debt-to-total- 
assetsz/) + r,7
Level-2: Poy = 700 + Yoi (Percent routine patient days/) + 702 (Number of services/) + Uoj 
Piy = Y10 + 711 (Percent routine patient days/) + 712 (Number of services/)
P2y = 720 + 721 (Percent routine patient days/) + 722 (Number of services/)
Psy = 730 + 731 (Percent routine patient days/) + 732 (Number of services/)
P4y = 740 + 741 (Percent routine patient days/) + 742 (Number of services/)
Psy = 750 + Y5i (Percent routine patient days/) + 752 (Number of services/)
Poy = 760 + 761 (Percent routine patient days/) + y62 (Number of services/)
The prediction of Piy - p6y by level-2 variables results in interaction terms that are 
estimates o f cross-level effects. To test level-2 moderation, level-1 variables are 
“centered” around their group means. When group mean centering is used, significant 
level-2 variables indicate moderating or cross-level effects o f strategic group 
characteristics on the firm resource—performance relationships examined at level-1 (cf. 
Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
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In sum, HLM allows for tests of (1) the amount o f variance in hospital 
performance explained by organization uniqueness versus strategic group membership, 
(2) the main effects of strategic group characteristics on hospital performance and (3) the 
moderating role of strategic group characteristics on hospital resource-performance 
relationships.
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APPENDIX B: HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING PROCEDURE FOR
COMPUSTAT DATA
A three level HLM model was used to test the effects o f firms (level-1) nested 
within strategic groups (level-2) nested within industries (level-3). The simplest three- 
level model is a fully unconditional model (i.e., no predictors at any level). This model 
represents how variation in performance is allocated across the different levels o f analysis 
(i.e., firm, strategic group, industry).
The level-1 model represents the performance for each firm as a function of a 
strategic group mean plus random error using the following equation:
Performance jjk = Tt0jk + Cijk,
where Performance^ is the average performance for a single dependent variable (e.g., 
ROA) o f firm / in strategic group j  and industry k; Tc0jk is the mean performance of 
strategic group j  in industry k\ e ^  is a random “firm effect” that measures the deviation of 
firm ijk’s score from the strategic group mean. These effects are assumed normally 
distributed with a mean of 0 and variance a2. The subscripts i j ,  and k denote firms, 
strategic groups, and industries where there are / = 1,2 , . . . ,  %  firms within strategic group 
j  in industry k; j=  1,2,...^/* strategic groups within industry k; and£=  1,2,..., K  
industries.
The level-2 model examines each strategic group mean, ttojk as an outcome 
varying randomly around some industry mean using the following formula:
Ttojk = Pook+  rqjk»
where pook is the mean performance in industry k; r0jk is a random “strategic group 
effect,” that is, the deviation of strategic group Jk’s mean from the industry mean. These 
effects are assumed normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance x*. Within each 
of the K  industries, the variability among strategic groups is assumed the same.
The level-3 model represents the variability among industries. The industry 
mean, Pook, varies randomly around a grand mean as presented in the following formula:
Pook =  YOOO +  Wook,
where yooo is the grand mean; «ook is the random “industry effect,” that is, the deviation of 
industry k's mean from the grand mean. These effects are assumed normally distributed 
with a mean of 0 and variance xp.
This simple three-level model partitions the total variability in the outcome 
Performancep  into its three components: (level-1) among firms within strategic groups, 
cr; (level-2) among strategic groups within industries, x*; and (level-3) among 
industries, xp. This partitioning allows for estimates o f the proportion of variation that is 
within strategic groups, among strategic groups within industries, and among industries. 
Specifically,
a 2/ (a2 + x* + xp) is the proportion of variance within strategic groups;
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fit /  (cr2+t„ + ip) is the proportion of variance among strategic groups within industries; 
and
xp / (a2 + xs + tp) is the proportion o f variance among industries.
Tliis fully unconditional model allows for estimation of variability associated with each 
of the three levels (i.e., firms, strategic groups, industries). This model provides for a 
direct test of hypothesis 1.
In addition to the ability to estimate variance components at multiple levels of 
analysis (i.e., hypothesis 1), HLM is also able to test the effects of multiple independent 
variables at each level. This feature is used to test hypothesis 2, which argues that 
strategic group characteristics have a direct affect on firm performance above and beyond 
firm resources. This was tested by adding strategic group level measures (i.e., group 
operations breadth and source of competitive advantage; poij and p02j) at level-2 to predict 
group performance (tiojk)- This is illustrated by the following equation:
Performance^ = rcojk + ftijk (Capital Intensity)^ + 7t2jk (Percent Foreign Sales)jjk + 7t3jk 
(Patents )ijk + rc4jk (Reputation)^ + 7i5jk (Current Ratio)^ + 7t6jk(Debt-to-equity)ijk + enk,
n0jk = Pooj + Poij(R&D Intensity)// + Po2j(Trademarks)// + r0y
Pook =  Yooo +  t^OOk
HLM provides a /-test for each level-2 parameter. It is worth noting that when using 
HLM, centering decisions effect the substantive conclusions drawn from empirical tests 
(Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). To model the incremental effect of group characteristics 
beyond individual firm resources, level-1 variables are centered around their grand means 
(Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Hypotheses 3 argues that strategic group characteristics moderate relationships 
between firm resources and performance. This was tested by adding strategic group level 
measures at level-2 to predict significant independent variables at level-1. This is 
illustrated by the following equation:
Performanceyk = ttojk + ttijk (Capital Intensity)^ + rr^k (Percent Foreign Sales)jjk + ^ k  
(Patents)ijk + rtyk (Reputation)jjk + rtsjk (Current Ratio)^ + n6j (Debt-to-equity)jjk + e ^ ,
7tojk = Pooj + Poij(R&D Intensity)// + Po2j(Trademarks)// + r0ij 
7xijk = Pioj + Pnj(R&D Intensity)// + p^(Trademarks)//
7t2jk = P20J + P2ij(R&D Intensity)// + P22j(Trademarks)//
7t3jk = P30J + p3ij(R&D Intensity)// + P32j(Trademarks)//
7r4jk = P4oj + p4ij(R&D Intensity)// + p42j(Trademarks)// 
iT5jk = Psoj + Psij(R&D Intensity)// + Ps2j(Trademarks)//
7r6jk = Peoj + p6ij(R&D Intensity)// + p62j(Trademarks)//
Pook = Yooo + f^ OOk
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Level-l variables must be “centered” around their group means for significant level-2 
variables to indicate a moderating or cross level effect (cf. Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Hypothesis 4 argues that industry characteristics moderate the relationship 
between strategic group characteristics and performance. To test this hypothesis, 
industry predictors at level-3 (i.e., munificence, dynamism, complexity) are used to 
predict group characteristics (i.e., pooj, poij and po2j) at level-2. Thus, the following 
additional equations are measured:
Performance ijk = Kojk + Cjjk,
Ttojk=Pooj + Poij(R&D Intensity)// + Po2j(Trademarks)//' + r0jj
Pooj = Yooo + Yoo i (Munificence) + 7002 (Dynamism) + Y003 (Complexity) + U00k 
Pou = Y010 + Yoi 1 (Munificence) + Y012 (Dynamism) + yon (Complexity)
Po2j = Y020 + Y021 (Munificence) + Y022 (Dynamism) + Y023 (Complexity)
Note that the equations estimating Poij and Po2j at level-3 are nonrandomly varying (i.e., 
the U parameters are not estimated). Thus, I make the assumption that munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity “capture” the industry construct (c.f. Dess et al., 1990).
In sum, HLM allows for tests o f (1) the amount o f variance in firm performance 
explained by firms, strategic groups, and industries (2) the main effects o f strategic group 
characteristics on performance controlling for firm resources (3) the moderating role of 
strategic group characteristics on firm resource-performance relationships, and (4) the 
moderating role of industry characteristics on strategic group characteristic — 
performance relationships.
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